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2SUMMARY
The paper places in a broad historical per-
spective the transition to a market economy
in the successor countries of former Yugo-
slavia.
Part 1 describes historical factors and
the international environment. Ethnically,
the Yugoslav Federation of the socialist pe-
riod was a country composed mainly of
South Slavs, but from the historical and
cultural points of view, it bridged Central
Europe (Slovenia and Croatia) and the Bal-
kans (FR Yugoslavia and other republics).
The disintegration process was also influ-
enced by the international environment, as
the Yalta system and the Cold War ended at
the turn of the 1990s and the EC pursued
further integration. The menace of the So-
viet Union, a factor serving to unite nations
in the former Yugoslavia into a single
country, was lifted. The reason why the
Yugoslav Federation disintegrated and atro-
cious national conflicts broke out can be
traced to the collapse of the 1974 Constitu-
tion, which had turned Yugoslavia into a
federation tinged with confederative ele-
ments – a weak federal government sup-
ported by a strong centralized party. So long
as the League of Yugoslav Communists
(LYC) retained its prestige, the regime was
safe, but once this was lost, the regime
could not survive and the inter-republican
threshold became ever higher. Thus disinte-
gration of the economy had already begun
in the 1970s. The Yugoslav economy began
to stagnate at the beginning of the 1980s
and became mired in the mid-1980s. The
loss of party prestige culminated in January
1990 in a split into republican constituents.
Between April and December 1990, free,
multi-party elections took place in each re-
public, where goals had become disparate.
Croatia faced a serious ethnicity problem.
Bosnia-Herzegovina contained Muslims,
Serbs and Croats living in a symbiotic rela-
tionship. It became clear that these coun-
tries could not secede from the Yugoslav
Federation without bloodshed. Slovenia’s
rush to independence led to a tragic disinte-
gration of Yugoslavia. The faint chance and
sincere effort to avoid civil war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina eventually failed. National
conflicts were precipitated by internal col-
lapse and worsened by international actions
that accelerated the process from without.
Part 2 examines the process of transi-
tion to a market economy in each successor
country. Slovenia, the most homogeneous of
any constituent republic or province, suf-
fered relatively little damage in the inde-
pendence conflict as it undertook its ‘double
transition, from a socialist to a market
economy and from a regional economy to a
national economy.’ Nor was its transition-
induced recession very deep. More serious
were the costs incurred through secession
and independence. The main cause of the
recession was a drastic reduction in trade
with other former Yugoslav republics,
which was offset by increasing exports to
West Europe. Slovenia, in fact, was suc-
cessful in entering the EU markets. With
privatization, there was a heated contro-
versy between advocates of gradual, decen-
tralized, commercial privatization on the
one hand and mass, centralized, distributive
privatization on the other. The privatization
legislation of 1992 was a compromise en-
compassing features of both, including pri-
vatization by free distribution of ownership
certificates to all citizens. For the time be-
ing, this small country’s strategy in finding
appropriate areas for specialization has
been successful. Furthermore, events in the
outside world – the end of the Cold War,
globalization and regionalism – have gone
in Slovenia’s favour. Western countries re-
sponded warmly to Croatia on its independ-
ence, but were gradually repelled by Presi-
dent Franjo Tudjman’s overtly nationalistic
course. The political dominance of the
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) was
unshaken until the early 2000, as opposi-
tion parties remained weak. Tudjman’s po-
litical style was rather authoritarian. In the
course of privatization, small and medium-
sized companies were purchased by em-
ployees and management using preferential
credits, while large companies, which were
nationalized first, came under the manage-
ment of confidants of the ruling party,
which produced a small number of gov-
ernment-approved tycoons concentrating
huge wealth in their hands. This approach
led to deadlock at the end of the 1990s. In-
creasing public dissatisfaction led to an op-
position victory in the general elections of
January 2000 and a new coalition govern-
ment centred on social democratic parties,
embarking on economic restructuring and
efforts to join the EU. The Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) ex-
perienced two wars and two post-war re-
coveries within a decade. The civil war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina from April 1992 to
November 1995 resulting in UN sanctions
being imposed on the Federation. Then
came the Kosovo war. The economy of the
FR Yugoslavia was damaged by the wars,
sanctions and international isolation, pro-
ducing a crisis in which the public had little
option but to support the undemocratic
Milosevic government through thick and
thin. Privatization in the first half of the
1990s was frustrated by astronomical infla-
tion. The Titoite notion of ‘social ownership’
meant that officially the state had not
owned the means of production in the so-
cialist period. Paradoxically, therefore, the
change of system turned the state into the
biggest owner after the system change, with
members of the ruling party being ap-
pointed to managerial positions. The budget
constraint in state and socially owned firms
remained soft. The main borrowers from
the banks remained their owners. The col-
lapse of the Milosevic regime in October
2000 left the economy in a parlous state.
New privatization legislation was adopted
in May 2001 and a start was made to pri-
vatization, much later than in the other
post-socialist, transition countries of Central
and Eastern Europe. There was a crucial
shortage of capital and an urgent need for
FDI, especially by strategic investors. The
transition to a market economy in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and in Macedonia is still at an
initial stage. Like Serbia and Montenegro,
they need to develop regional cooperation
with other Balkan countries, with the hope
of joining the EU in the distant future.
The international community has ex-
tended less assistance to the Balkans than to
Central and Eastern Europe. Attention and
aid for economic reconstruction and stabili-
zation need to be greatly increased to bring
lasting peace to the region.
5INTRODUCTION*
An underlying cause of the national con-
flicts that split former Yugoslavia was the
economic crisis that surfaced in the 1980s
and continued for more than ten years.
Economic performance differed in northern
and southern republics, although they all
still operated under the system of socialist
self-management. The
break-up of the Federation
produced five independent
countries: Slovenia, Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, a new
Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via (composed of Serbia and
Montenegro) and Macedo-
nia.
Transition to a market,
or more precisely capitalist
economy became inevitable
after the collapse of the socialist system.
However, the decentralized, self-managed
model of socialism differed strongly from
the Soviet type, so that the transition in the
countries of former Yugoslavia could be
said to be from an incomplete to a fully-
fledged market economy.
Most people in Western Europe and
the United States show bias when they view
the problems of former Yugoslavia. Eastern
Europe is very far from Japan and the cul-
tural and economic ties have been weak. In
this respect, Japanese researchers such as
the author are handicapped, but on the
other hand, they find it easier remain ob-
jective. This paper takes an approach that
                                                
* The author, Yoji Koyama is professor of Russian and
East European Economies, Faculty of Economics, Nii-
gata University, Japan. This paper is a revised and
enlarged version of my paper (2000b). I would like
to express special thanks to Bruce Brown, associate
professor at Niigata University from 1997 to 2000,
for his kind help in translating the Japanese text. I
would also like to express gratitude to Eva Ehrlich,
Gábor Révész, Tamás Novák, Aleksandar Sevic and
Vera Vratusa-Zunjic for their valuable comments.
combines economic history with interna-
tional relations.
It is important when analysing eco-
nomic performances in the North and the
South to consider three groups of factors: (i)
the historical factors, including differences
in initial conditions, i.e. the underlying so-
ciety, the maturity of civil society, the de-
velopment level of the pre-socialist market
economy etc. (ii) the international environ-
ment, and iii) the orientation of the political
elite.
The paper begins with a brief discus-
sion of historical factors and the interna-
tional environment. Then the reasons for
the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the
outbreak of atrocious ethnic conflicts are
discussed. Comparisons are made between
the northern and southern republics, espe-
cially Slovenia, Croatia and the new Yugo-
slavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia
being omitted because the transition to a
market economy has hardly begun there.
Finally, the prospects for the region are
considered.
Table 1
The successor states
Area
(km2)
Population
 (million) Currency
Per capita
GDP (USD)
Slovenia  20,251  2.0 Tolar  10,109
Croatia  56,538  4.54 Kuna  4,406
Bosnia-Herzegovina  51,129  3.2 Conv. mark  1,027
FR Yugoslavia 102,173  9.54  940
Serbia  88,361  8.98 Dinar
Montenegro  13,812  0.56 DEM (Euro)
Macedonia  25,713  2.03 Denar  1,702
Source: WIIW (2001).
61) HISTORICAL FACTORS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1.1. Historical factors
Examining movements in Eastern Europe
after the collapse of the socialist regimes
underscores again the importance of his-
tory. The Eastern European countries other
than the Soviet successor states, which ex-
perienced a succession of political changes
(‘democratization’) and aimed at a transi-
tion to a market economy and capitalism,
can be classified broadly into the Central
and Eastern European countries and the
South-East European countries of the Bal-
kans. The former belong to an area cultur-
ally influenced by Catholicism and have
strong historical, cultural and economic ties
with Germany and Austria. They returned
to Central Europe, as it were, as soon as the
Cold War ended. In the Balkans, on the
other hand, civil society was underdevel-
oped and the area had been culturally
dominated by Greek Orthodoxy.1 There was
still a noticeable legacy from centuries of
rule by the Ottoman Empire.
When the author visited Budapest in
May 1991, László Láng, director of the Re-
search Centre of Central Europe, explained
that Central European countries has a
‘common experience’. Central Europe is
very cohesive and coincides with the extent
of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.
Again, there are historical reasons for this.
What today constitute Southern Poland, Bo-
hemia, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia all
reached their period of modernization while
they formed a part of the Austro-Hungarian
                                                
1 On civil society, see Bibic and Graziano (1994). In
Japan, theoretical research on civil society is repre-
sented by Hirata (1968).
dominions. This meant they were affected
by European or international trends in
transportation, cultural achievements and
level of technology. They share a historical
experience of coexistence within the same
empire. Even today, an industrial map of
Eastern Europe shows clear concentration
from South Poland through Moravia, Bo-
hemia, Western Hungary and down to West
Croatia and Slovenia. The line is still visible
85 years after the Austro-Hungarian Mon-
archy collapsed (Koyama 1992, p. 85).
Láng added that the difference be-
tween the Central Europe and the Balkans is
historically ascribed to the difference be-
tween Catholic and Byzantine influences.
Central Europe also differs from other re-
gions politically, in that the churches were
less closely connected with state power. On
the contrary, the church in Byzantine
Europe was always entangled with the
states. Although civil society did not develop
in Central Europe, there was a chance for it
to happen. The difference in church-state
relations is the main reason behind the dis-
tinction between Central Europe and the
Balkans. The political processes of the west-
ern and southern parts of Eastern Europe
remain different to this day (Ibid., p. 84).
Lang’s view should be considered
when studying the processes of the transi-
tion to market economies in Eastern
Europe.2 Teruji Suzuki, a specialist of com-
parative law, attaches importance to
whether countries inherited the system of
Roman law, through the study of jurispru-
dence in medieval universities in Central
Europe.3 Roman law supported right of
                                                
2 Rule by the Austro-Hungarian (Habsburg) Monar-
chy had positive as well as negative aspects. A series
of reforms, including the educational system, was
carried out in the reign of Maria Theresa (1741–80).
The spirit of reform was continued by her son Joseph
II, who carried out abolition of serfdom and torture,
promulgation of religious toleration, and promotion
of industrial development. When Joze Mencinger, a
prominent Slovenian economist, was asked by the
author for the reason for his country’s economic
success in an interview (April 1, 1997), he referred
unexpectedly to Maria Theresa’s education reforms.
3 For detail on Roman law, see Stein (1999). The
author is also indebted to Christopher Beermann,
associate professor at the Niigata University Faculty
7ownership, so that it was the foundation for
the subsequent development of market
economies. Roman law was not inherited by
countries imbued with Orthodox Christian-
ity – Russia and the Balkans, where the con-
cept of ownership never became so deep-
rooted (Suzuki 1998). Of course, this can-
not be determined quantitatively, but it
seems to have effected a relative delay in the
development of a market economy in pre-
socialist Balkan countries.
Ethnically, the Yugoslav population
consisted mainly of South Slavs, but histori-
cally and culturally, it straddled Central
Europe and the Balkans. The Slovenes and
Croats who seceded from the Austro-
Hungarian Empire in 1918 formed a joint
state with the Serbs. This became the first
Yugoslavia, which later suffered chronic
national conflicts, and became after World
War II the second, socialist Yugoslavia un-
der Josip Brod Tito.
1.2. Changes in the international en-
vironment
The expulsion of Yugoslavia from Comin-
form in June 1948 amounted to expulsion
from the Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union and
other Eastern European countries imposed
an embargo and even threatened Yugoslavia
militarily. Communists in Yugoslavia be-
came sceptical about the Soviet type of so-
cialism and began to grope towards a so-
cialist road of their own.
Thereafter, relations with the West
gradually improved, and in 1949, the
United States began to extend economic and
military assistance to Yugoslavia. ‘The con-
tinued independence of Yugoslavia,’ Presi-
dent Truman argued, was ‘of great impor-
tance to the security of the United States’
(Hoffman and Neal 1962, p. 148). Such US
assistance continued until 1955, when rap-
prochement with the Soviet Union ensued.
                                                                         
of Law for recommending this book and for his own
explanations.
In 1958, however, the Soviet Union criti-
cized the new programme of the LYC,
which included references to the danger of
war through confrontation between either
the American or the Soviet bloc. Although
the relationship with the Soviet Union later
improved, Yugoslavia never returned to the
Soviet fold and continued to view the Soviet
Union almost as a ‘potential enemy’, citing
the 1948 expulsion, the Hungarian Revolu-
tion of 1956, the suppression of reform in
Czechoslovakia in 1968, and so on. Diplo-
matically, Yugoslavia remained neutral
between East and West and secured atten-
tion as the one socialist country in the non-
aligned movement. The West continued to
support Yugoslavia, because of the delicate
position it occupied in world politics.
Some 45 years after World War II,
which had been a unifying experience for
the main national groups of Yugoslavia as
they fought to liberate their country, the
international environment drastically
changed. Gorbachev, the promoter of per-
estroika in the Soviet Union, practically
abandoned the principle of limited sover-
eignty in 1988. Thereafter, the socialist re-
gimes of Eastern Europe collapsed one after
the other in 1989–90. Since the Yalta sys-
tem no longer applied and the Cold War
had ended, so had the menace of the Soviet
Union, a factor that had united the nations
of Yugoslavia into a single country. Also be-
hind them was the fear of German and
Italian expansionism, which was tradition-
ally menaced the Slovene nation. The Euro-
pean Community, meanwhile, was pursuing
further integration. ‘The end of the Cold
War made the previous deep political,
ideological and military gap along Slove-
nia’s Western and Northern borders with
Italy and Austria politically obsolete and
economically harmful. The Slovenes were
the most exposed and sensitive within the
former Yugoslavia to the demonstration ef-
fect of the West’s growing affluence, its
economic liberalism and political democ-
racy’ (Bebler 1997, p. 138).
82) COLLAPSE OF THE REGIME BASED
ON THE 1974 CONSTITUTION AND
THE OUTBREAK OF NATIONAL
CONFLICTS
One of Tito’s achievements had been to in-
tegrate the nations of Yugoslavia into a fed-
eral state of ‘fraternity and unity’, in a re-
gion where they had traditionally battled
with each other. In every national census of
that period, more than a million citizens
declared their national affiliation to be
‘Yugoslav’. The word ‘Yugoslav’ did not
mean citizen of Yugoslavia but defined a
national group reflecting ‘a dream of com-
munists, who tried to create Yugoslavs who
would rise above the national groups’
(Iwata 1983, p. 280). Unfortunately, Tito
failed to spread ‘Yugoslav’ consciousness
further than that.
Despite aid from the developed to the
less developed republics, through a Fund for
Accelerated Development at federal level,
the economic differences between North
and South widened. For example, the differ-
ence between Slovenia and Kosovo in per
capita GNP was 3.2:1 in 1947, but 6.9:1 in
1978 (Ramet 1984, p. 183).
As for relations between the federa-
tion and the constituent republics, one post-
war option, supported by the northern two
republics, was to encourage republic-level
development, another was to have a pow-
erful federal government, which the less
developed southern republics preferred,
along with resource redistribution through
the federal government. With hindsight,
there might have been a third option: a
powerful federal government in a capital
located neither in Belgrade nor Zagreb, for
instance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had
hitherto managed to transcend the problems
of national coexistence. No such option was
discussed. After the centralist Vice President
Aleksandar Rankovic fell from power in the
mid-1960s, the LYC leadership went for
decentralization and de-etatization.
State control weakened and market
forces increased after the economic reforms
of 1965. Graduate professionals and ‘tech-
nocrats’ played increasingly important
roles. However, market-economic ills such
as inflation, income differences between
enterprises and rising unemployment be-
came evident. By the late 1960s, a younger
generation was criticizing the government
and party leadership for emasculating self-
management and for tolerating detrimental
effects of market economics. The main con-
cern in the 1950s had been to struggle
against state bureaucrats and empower of
self-managed enterprises, but in the late
1960s and early 1970s it became a struggle
against technocracy.
The LYC pushed through amendments
to the country’s constitution in 1971. De-
signed to appease the developed republics,
these were systematized as the 1974 con-
stitution, which loosened the Yugoslav fed-
eration. Republics and autonomous prov-
inces gained prime sovereignty and all
powers except those explicitly granted to
the federation, i.e. foreign policy, defence,
measures to ensure a unitary Yugoslav mar-
ket, common monetary and foreign-trade
policies, and the principles of the political
system and ethnic and individual rights.
There was to be a collective head of state
with nine members – one from each repub-
lic and province, plus the party president.
Vojvodina and Kosovo, as autonomous
provinces within Serbia, had fewer dele-
gates to the Federal Assembly than the re-
publics, but they enjoyed the same de facto
position, with a veto over federal decision-
making. The Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia had become tinged with confed-
eration.4 Meanwhile the regime pursued
economic democracy, eliminating technoc-
racy and extending self-management to
workplaces smaller than ‘enterprises’. The
market mechanism was not foresworn, but
                                                
4 For the emergence of the regime under the 1974
constitution, see Rusinow (1977), pp. 284–5.
9a ‘contractual’ mechanism became empha-
sized instead. In addition, the regime pur-
sued democratization and ‘de-
professionalizing of politics, extending po-
litical participation by drawing large work-
ers and other citizens into a delegate
system. Nonetheless, the communists
of Yugoslavia still sought to realize
their goals within the framework of
a one-party system.
Although Yugoslavia was
unique in decentralizing and de-
etatizing in this way, it still shared
with the Soviet model a rejection of
the multi-party system. While the
constitution was being prepared, a
Croatian national movement arose
in 1971, which Tito eventually sup-
pressed, although his desires to
centralize again met with resistance from
local leaders reluctant to concede the pow-
ers obtained in the 1965 reform and subse-
quent constitutional amendments. Although
he was not able to reverse the decentraliza-
tion of the state, Tito concentrated on re-
centralizing the party. One Slovenian politi-
cal scientist has called the result a ‘centralist
federation’ (Fink-Hafner 1995), but in the
present author’s view, Yugoslavia at that
time had a weak federal government sup-
ported by a strong centralist party. In short,
the regime instituted by the 1974 constitu-
tion supposedly aimed at Utopian economic
democracy, but in fact was sustained by the
LYC, whose mobilization of the masses had
been the force binding decentralized, self-
managed socialism into a country. As long
as the party retained its prestige, the regime
was safe, but once it lost it, the regime was
doomed.
The self-managed enterprises had
considerable power, so that an albeit in-
complete mechanism of market coordina-
tion functioned. Full development of a mar-
ket economy, however, would require a
multi-party system to reflect the diverse in-
terests in society, as Milovan Djilas (later
purged and imprisoned) had posited back in
1954. Again with hindsight, one way in
which disintegration of the Federation
might have been avoided would have been
to have democratic parties straddling the
republics and provinces, which Tito’s
somewhat Bolshevik view of socialism pre-
cluded.
Table 3
Proportions of goods and services procured
from and delivered to other Yugoslav republics
or provinces, %
Outside pro-
curement
Outside
delivery
1970 1978 1970 1978
Slovenia 23.9 21.3 42.2 35.5
Croatia 27.4 20.3 37.2 28.9
Bosnia-Herzegovina 36.9 27.1 36.8 30.5
Montenegro 61.8 45.3 51.3 32.2
Macedonia 36.2 30.2 35.5 35.4
Serbia proper 32.6 26.1 40.4 30.8
Vojvodina 30.8 27.5 50.6 34.7
Kosovo 53.7 47.6 43.4 37.1
Yugoslavia
(average proportions) 38.0 31.0 40.0 32.0
Source: Ibid., p. 291.
Although the need for a unified
Yugoslav market was always stressed offi-
cially, the markets in each territory were
tending to close off in the 1970s. In Monte-
negro, for example, the proportion of goods
and services sold within the republic rose
from 48.7 per cent in 1970 to 64.5 per cent
in 1970 (Table 2), while the proportion of
commodities procured outside the republic
decreased from 51.3 to 32.2 per cent (Table
3). The inter-territorial thresholds were be-
coming higher, which ran against the his-
torical trend. Some economists went so far
as to see in this the emergence of eight na-
tional economies within Yugoslavia.
Table 2
Proportion of goods made and services performed within the
same republic or province, %
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978
Slovenia 57.8 59.2 63.3 64.5 66.3
Croatia 62.8 63.7 64.4 68.8 70.4
Bosnia-Herzegovina 63.2 65.2 68.9 67.3 69.1
Montenegro 48.7 53.2 55.5 62.7 64.5
Macedonia 66.5 66.6 68.3 63.4 65.2
Serbia proper 60.0 60.7 62.5 65.2 67.0
Vojvodina 50.0 53.6 56.2 62.6 64.4
Kosovo 56.6 62.2 55.8 62.6 64.4
Yugoslavia
(average proportions) 59.6 61.3 63.4 65.7 67.5
Source: Pavlovic and Stojanovic (1984), p. 290.
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These fragmenting tendencies were
further promoted by 1977 legislation on
foreign-currency dealings and external
credits, obliging each republic and province
to draw up a balance sheet of international
payments and to fulfil export and foreign-
earnings targets. In a seemingly contradic-
tory tendency, the territorial units were be-
coming linked directly to the world econ-
omy. There were many ‘cases in which the
same or similar goods were being exported
as another republic was importing from
abroad, i.e. inter-republican trade was be-
ing conducting through third countries’
(Korosic 1989, p. 72). The Yugoslav econ-
omy had already begun to fragment in the
1970s.
Yugoslavia enjoyed a relatively high
rate of economic growth until the late
1970s. While this continued, the country’s
national groups coexisted happily. This
rapid economic development in the 1970s
was based on loose economic controls in-
herent in the system of self-management,
which led to a sharp increase in the stock of
foreign debt. At the beginning of the 1980s,
the Yugoslav economy began to stagnate,
and by the mid-1980s, it was mired in a
crisis, to which the LYC failed to produce
effective solutions.5 The LCY, as the force
binding the territories and nations into a
country, gradually lost prestige. Conflicts of
                                                
5 To summarize, Yugoslavia had been pursuing
heavy and chemicals-led industrialization in the
1970s. At enterprise level, empowered workers
tended to distribute much of the gross income as
personal incomes (wages) and communal consump-
tion, so that relatively little was accumulated. Nev-
ertheless, the investment-hungry enterprises contin-
ued to borrow from domestic and foreign banks,
exploiting defects in the financial system and loose
practices at financial institutions designed to serve
self-managed enterprises, which themselves estab-
lished banks. Local politicians exerted strong influ-
ence on bank appointments and management. As the
bank debts of self-managed enterprises mounted,
local politicians had an interest in continued devel-
opment of the regional economy. Thus banks effec-
tively became managed by their big debtors. Mean-
while changes in the credit system in 1972 had
made it easy for enterprises to borrow abroad.
Yugoslavia’s stock of external debt rose from USD4
billion in 1970 to USD20 billion in the early 1980s.
For more detail, see Koyama (1995 and 1996).
interest between republics began to be re-
flected within the LYC itself.
Economic factors were of prime im-
port in Yugoslavia, as Ken’ichi Ohno dis-
cerningly argued: ‘Where plural ethnic
groups subjectively feel they share positive
benefits or negative damages, the “ethnic
boundaries” of their groups gradually fade,
fusion proceeds and national conflicts do
not occur. This is especially evident where
two groups experience disproportionate
benefits from cooperation (synergistic ef-
fects). Conversely, where plural ethnic
groups struggle for shares of a finite pie,
feelings of hostility are generated and
“ethnic boundaries” actualized. Thereupon
they fall into a self-inducing process
whereby own-group consciousness and ex-
tra-group hatreds are fortified by tension
that is heightened in turn by the consciously
asymmetric perceptions (“we” as good and
peaceful, “they” as evil and militant, etc.).
In this case, national conflicts escalate at
accelerating speed’ (Ohno 1996, p. 256).
What triggered the conflicts among
the republics was the Kosovo problem. After
the suppression of revolts in 1981, the dis-
content of the Albanian community in
Yugoslavia turned inwards. There was
mounting violence towards local Slav mi-
norities and plundering, and scores of
thousands of members of the Slav minorities
fled from the province in subsequent years.
Many people in Serbia proper became in-
censed by the inability of the Serbian
authorities to protect their brethren in
Kosovo, although the province was part of
the republic. Slobodan Milosevic came to
the fore in the League of Communists of
Serbia advocating outright Serbian nation-
alism, securing the post of party president
in Serbia in 1987. The next year, on his ini-
tiative, Serbia amended its constitution to
reduce the powers of the autonomous
provinces. In July 1990, the Republic of
Serbia dissolved the Kosovo Assembly and
imposed direct rule. Meanwhile Croatia and
Slovenia were becoming increasingly criti-
cal of Milosevic’s political style and the in-
crease in Serbia’s weight within the federa-
tion.
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According to Table 4, based on a sur-
vey in spring of 1989, the most positive at-
titude toward political pluralism was shown
by Slovene communists. On the subject of
‘striving for a multi-party system’, for ex-
ample, 36 per cent of Slovene communists
responded positively, which was far more
than the 19 per cent of Croatian commu-
nists. With ‘recognizing the existence and
activity of new alliances’, 44 per cent of
Slovenian communists responded positively,
followed by 24 per cent of Kosovo commu-
nists, who were embroiled in a very serious
ethnic problem. ‘LYC members in Slovenia
strove for the most radical change’ (Fink-
Hafner 1991, p. 11), while communists in
Montenegro and Serbia were generally
conservative.
Table 4
Attitudes to a political pluralism among LYC
members in republics and provinces, % in sup-
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Montenegro 6 9 12
Serbia 9 8 10
Vojvodina 10 12 14
Bosnia-Herzegovina 12 14 18
Macedonia 14 14 16
Kosovo 16 24 24
Croatia 19 19 24
Slovenia 36 44 46
Source: Siber, I. (1989): Komunisti Jugoslavije o
drustvenoj reformi. Belgrade: IC Komunist, p. 29.
Quoted by Fink-Hafner (1991), p. 11.
The LYC finally split in January 1990
and free, multi-party elections ensued in
each republic in April–December that year.
Slovenia’s April elections brought in a non-
communist government, but the new presi-
dent was the ‘Social Democrat-Communist’
Milan Kucan. In Croatia, the new president
was the avid Croatian nationalist Franjo
Tudjman, with a non-communist govern-
ment. By contrast, the elections in Serbia in
December 1990 were won by the Socialist
Party of Serbia, which had been created by a
merger of the League of Communists of Ser-
bia with its popular-front organization. In
Montenegro, the League of Communists of
Montenegro won. In both cases, the com-
munists took a nationalistic line and gained
support from many workers uneasy about
their jobs. A non-communist government
was formed in Macedonia. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, its symbiotic communities of
Muslims, Serbs and Croats voted in a coali-
tion government of dominant parties from
each, reflecting the delicate national bal-
ance.
In this way, the goals of the republics
became disparate. Were tragic nationality
conflicts inevitable? In this author’s view, as
the effort to foster ‘Yugoslav’ consciousness
and maintain the federation had turned out
to be unsuccessful in 1991, the second best
choice was to remodel the federation into a
confederation. Otherwise the disintegration
of the federation was inevitable, but there
would still remain a possibility of a peace-
ful, longer process of separation based on
negotiations. If the international community
had been prepared to intervene in the inter-
republican disputes, it should have sup-
ported the process of remodelling or of
peaceful negotiated separation. Instead, the
international community coped with the
Yugoslav question in a blundering way.
At the time, the international commu-
nity did not want the Yugoslav federation to
break up and the West supported its con-
tinuation until the first half of 1991. The
foreign ministers’ meeting of the Commis-
sion on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), held on June 19, 1991, confirmed
its support for the unity of the Yugoslav
Federation. US Secretary of the State James
Baker visited Belgrade on June 21 and an-
nounced that the US would never approve
any unilateral secession.
However, Slovenia made a forcible
move towards independence, successfully
targeting its neighbour and former ruler
Austria for support. To general surprise,
Alois Mock, the Austrian foreign minister
used the technique of including his Slove-
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nian counterpart, Dimitrij Rupel, in the
Austrian CSCE delegation.
Iwata (1999, p. 158) quotes a sen-
tence from a book by an American ambas-
sador to the Vatican, which had not been
seriously involved in politics since the mid-
19th century: ‘By the middle of 1991, the
Vatican moved into unprecedented action to
become a leader of the process of diplomatic
recognition.’ According to Gianni de Mike-
lis, a former Italian foreign minister, Jeffrey
D. Sachs, the Harvard economist, went to
Ljubljana and told the Slovene government
that ‘in order to join Europe they would
need to liberate themselves from the yoke of
Belgrade’ (Iwata 1994, p. 126). Support
from Italy was unclear, but remarks by
Mikelis suggest that some Italians were in-
volved in the preparatory operations. He
suggested the convening of a brains trust of
specialists in which ‘some Austrians and
some Italians participated and prepared a
scenario on how to contrive a collision, so
as to create a climate of world public opin-
ion favourable to Slovenia’ (Ibid., p. 129).
Slovenia and Croatia declared inde-
pendence on June 25, 1991, with Slovenia,
in particular, promptly translating it into
action and establishing its own border con-
trols. In response, Federal Prime Minister
Ante Markovic (incidentally a Croat) issued
a statement, in which he ‘rejected Slovenia’s
independence and ordered Defence Minis-
ter Kadijevic to send in units of the Federal
Army and defend the checkpoint on the
border with Austria’ (Nakamura 1994, p.
32). This put the federal army in a state of
war with the Slovene defence forces, in an
operation that failed ‘because of skilful Slo-
vene tactics towards the media, which made
world opinion critical of the Federal Army’
(Ibid.) After mediation by three EU foreign
ministers (of Luxembourg, Netherlands and
Italy) and repeated cease-fires and renewals
of fighting, Slovenia and Croatia suspended
their declarations of independence for three
months. When the suspension expired in
September 1991, the focuses of the fighting
to the Slavonia region of north-east Croatia
and Slovenia was tacitly allowed by
Milosevic to assert its independence, which
hastened the tragic disintegration of the
Yugoslav federation (Glenny 1996).6
Croatia, unlike Slovenia in the north-
ernmost part of Yugoslavia and was bor-
dered by Western European countries, faced
serious ethnic problems. The Serbs of Croa-
tia counteracted discrimination and har-
assment by the new government by declar-
ing an ‘Autonomous District of Krajina’,
within which the local Croats then became
an intimidated minority. It soon became ob-
vious that Croatia could not secede from
Yugoslavia without bloodshed.
Ethnic animosities had been exacer-
bated fifty years earlier, when Hitler’s Ger-
many supported the Croatian fascist Ustasa
movement in World War II, so that Ger-
many in 1991 should certainly have taken a
more prudent position on the Yugoslav cri-
sis. Instead, Germany took the initiative
within the EU in recognizing Slovenia and
Croatia and rejecting the caution shown by
France and other countries. As a Japanese
daily paper commented, ‘Foreign Minister
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who thought that
the reunification of Germany was a result of
“the right of national self-determination”,
insisted that Germany’s special task was to
support such a “right of national self-
determination” for other countries too’
(Asahi Shimbun, January 11, 1992). Ap-
plying this principle to multinational Yugo-
slavia was simplistic, but on December 23,
1991, Germany had gone ahead and recog-
nized not only Slovenia, but also Croatia as
independent states.
The Badinter Arbitration Committee,
established alongside the EC peace confer-
ence for Yugoslavia and composed of presi-
dents of constitutional courts from five EC
countries, received representations from all
Yugoslav republics except Serbia and Mon-
tenegro, calling for recognition of their in-
dependence. On January 11, 1992, the
Badinter Committee advised that Slovenia
                                                
6 Hiroyuki Iwata has also questioned Slovenia’s re-
sponsibility: ‘The hostile nationalism of the Croats
and Serbs was rampant… but the fuse would not
have blown unless an electric current had been sent
from Austria and Germany ’ (Iwata 1994, p. 90).
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and Macedonia satisfied the requirements
for immediate recognition. Croatia, how-
ever, could not be recognized immediately
because the Croatian government needed to
show more consideration for its ethnic mi-
norities, for whose protection there should
be constitutional safeguards. In the event,
the EC Council decided not to recognize
Macedonia, but to recognize both Slovenia
and Croatia, feeling obliged to follow Ger-
many’s lead rather than jeopardize EC
unity. On January 15, 1992, other EC
countries did likewise.
The largest of the three communities
in Bosnia-Herzegovina were the Muslims
(‘Bosnians’) with 43.7 per cent, followed by
the Serbs (33 per cent) and the Croats (17.3
per cent). The three nations lived in mixed
communities, not segregated ones for the
most part. The periods of peaceful coexis-
tence had been much longer than those of
disputes, giving rise to a regional con-
sciousness (‘Mi smo bosanci’). The Japanese
observer Professor Hiroshi Iwata (1999)
notes that the Serb and Muslim leaders
came close to an agreement to avoid civil
war in July 19917. Similar views have been
                                                
7 The efforts by the Muslim politician Adil Zulfikar-
pasic are described in Chapters 5 and 6 of Iwata
(1999). Although a traditional Muslim aristocrat, he
had joined the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and
fought with Tito’s partisans, but gone into exile in
Italy in 1946. He eventually became a millionaire
and Bosnian politician based in Zurich, returning to
to Bosnia-Herzegovina and establishing a new party,
the Muslim Bosnian Organization (MBO), after the
collapse of the communist regime.. This party domi-
nated by intellectuals won little support and gained
only three seats in the general elections of November
1990, as opposed to 86 seats for the Muslim nation-
alist Party of Democratic Action (SDA) headed by
Alija Izetbegovic. The Slovenian conflict of June
1991 alarmed many Bosnians, who feared a repeti-
tion of the ethnic murders of World War II. The
Zulfikarpasic initiative received endorsement from
Izetbegovic on July 12, 1991. (The phrase ‘Belgrade
Initiative’ used in the Western media was mistaken.)
On July 13, Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic (vice-
president of the MBO and a member of Parliament)
sat down with Radovan Karazdjic and Momcilo
Krajsnik (chairman of the Republican Parliament) on
the Serb side. It was agreed that the Muslims would
accept coexistence with the Serbs in a confederative
Yugoslavia, while the Serbs would postpone estab-
lishing a ‘Regija’ (Serb territory). With Izetbegovic’s
consent, Zulfikarpasic met Milosevic on July 14 in
Belgrade and obtained his endorsement. The draft
expressed by the journalist Misha Glenny:
‘The decision by the European Community
to recognize Slovenia and Croatia pushed
Bosnia into the abyss. Once this had hap-
pened, the Bosnian government had only
three roads along which it could travel and
each led to war. It could have stayed in the
rump Yugoslavia and been ruled over by
Milosevic and Serbia. It could have accepted
the territorial division of Bosnia between
Serbia and Croatia, as suggested by Tud-
jman and Milosevic. Or it could have ap-
plied for recognition as an independent
state. The Croats and Moslems considered
the first solution unacceptable; the Moslems
and Yugoslavs, the second; and the Serbs,
the third. This enforced choice could not
have been presented at a worst time – Ser-
bia and Croatia had been radicalized by the
trauma of a war which neither side had yet
won and neither side lost’ (Glenny 1996,
pp. 143–4). Elsewhere he adds, ‘The death
sentence for Bosnia-Herzegovina was
passed in the middle of December 1991
when Germany announced that it would
recognize Slovenia and Croatia uncondi-
tionally on 15 January 1992. So distressed
was Alija Izetbegovic by this news that he
travelled to Bonn in a vain effort to per-
suade Kohl and Genscher not to go ahead
with the move. Izetbegovic understood full
well that recognition would strip Bosnia of
the constitutional protection it still enjoyed
from the territorial claims of the two re-
gional imperia, Serbia and Croatia’ (Ibid., p.
163).8
                                                                         
agreement needed only the signature of Izetbegovic,
who was visiting the United States. Wide reports of
the draft agreement caused immediate relief of the
tensions between the two communities. Joint rallies
were held in Trebinje, in southern Herzegovina, and
Zbornik, in eastern Bosnia. The agreement was then
unexpectedly rejected by the SDA. According to
Iwata, Milovan Djilas considered that the Izetbegovic
faction, counting on support from the Islamic world
and US favour, thought it could gain hegemony over
the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Zulfi-
karpasic, on the other hand, underestimated the po-
litical power of those whose priority was dissolution
of Yugoslavia, rather than problems of war or peace
(Ibid., p. 230).
8 ‘Bosnia could only have been saved if a political
party spanning the three communities had emerged
as the most powerful after the collapse of communist
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The government of Bosnia was com-
pelled to choose the third course. On De-
cember 20, 1991, its foreign minister re-
quested recognition from the EC, which in
turn requested that Bosnian leadership to
conduct a plebiscite as a precondition for
recognition. On February 29, 1992, the
Bosnian leadership took a plebiscite on in-
dependence despite a Serb boycott and then
declared independence on the grounds that
60 per cent of the eligible voters had sup-
ported it. The EC, pressed by Germany, rec-
ognized Bosnia and Herzegovina as an in-
dependent state on April 6.
Contrary to Western expectations,
armed groups from each national commu-
nity, led by extreme nationalists, began to
fight for ground. The biggest victims were
the Muslims and world opinion was roused
by news of Serbian death camps and sys-
temic rape of Muslim women. However,
similar deeds occurred to some extent in
Muslim and Croat-ruled territory as well.
Although the conflict between the national
groups was an intricate one, Western
countries set out to examine who was right
and who was wrong. The United States, in
particular, was eager to solve the problem
by finding and attacking villains. In the
early stages, Croatia won a propaganda
victory over Serbia.9 The United States and
Western Europe tended to judge matters in
Central Europe and the Balkans by Western
European standards. Croatia, with its
Catholic culture, was found more congenial
than Serbia, and the implications of Tud-
jman’s extreme nationalism were ignored,
                                                                         
power. The poverty of the pluralist system based on
the three national parties was demonstrated by the
structures which it spawned’ (Glenny 1996, p. 148).
By the end of 1991, the disintegration of the Yugo-
slav Federation had become an undisputed fact, with
fierce civil warfare in Croatia. Movements for sepa-
ration and independence appeared in both Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Macedonia, which broke up the
tripartite coalition in the former.
9 Serbia’s propaganda defeat is discussed in Yama-
saki (1993). The author points out that the one in-
ternational TV relay station in Yugoslavia was lo-
cated in Zagreb, so that Serbia was cut off from
sending out television news during the first three
months of the war, by which time international
opinion was firmly anti-Serb (p. 59).
while Serbia was made the villain. This ap-
proach by the Western countries made re-
solving the national conflicts more difficult.
In short, the conflicts were caused by an
internal collapse, worsened by international
actions that had the effect of acceleration
the process. The way the international
community misunderstood the conflicts in
Yugoslavia is evocatively demonstrated by
the Dutch political scientist Koen Koch. Ac-
cording to his report, delivered at a confer-
ence on Yugoslavia held in the Hague in
November 1991, the conflict was not feder-
alism versus confederation, democracy
versus communism, or pluralism versus na-
tionalism. Western Europe saw the conflict
as one with Slovenia and Croatia on one
side, aiming at a market economy and de-
mocracy, and Serbia on the other, trying to
keep up the old command economy. In fact,
the Croatian government was as authori-
tarian as the Serbian. It is also misleading to
define the Yugoslav conflict as basically an
ethnic conflict, a battle between Serbs and
Croats imbued with hatred centuries old.
What was witnessed in fact was a power
struggle between old and new political
elites, using nationalistic rhetoric to boost
their own positions of power and privilege,
regardless of the interests of those they
claimed to be fighting for. Both in Serbia
and Croatia, government-controlled media
revived memories of World War II atrocities
and disseminated ethnic stereotypes and
prejudices. This media war and the ensuing
conflict curdled populations into their con-
stituent ethnic groups. Serbs and Croats
alike were manipulated by their nationalist
leaders, who benefited personally from ex-
acerbating the conflict, whereas the popu-
lation was harmed directly. Nationalism,
Koch argued, had to be replaced by a plu-
ralism that accepts unique cultures, relig-
ions and languages. Only when the nation-
alist leadership was replaced by representa-
tives of the democratic opposition, would
the conflict end (Koch 1992, pp. 191–201).
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3) SLOVENIA’S DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY AND TRANSITION TO A
MARKET ECONOMY
3.1. Development strategy
Slovenia, a country with an area of 20,251
sq. km and with population of less than 2
million, is ethnically the most homogenous
of the former republics and provinces of
Yugoslavia (90.1 per cent Slovene). Damage
in the ‘independence war’ of 1991 was
relatively minor.
In mid-1993, the government com-
missioned a long-term economic-
development strategy from the Institute for
Macroeconomic Analysis and Development,
which produced a detailed report in April
1995, entitled ‘Strategy for Economic De-
velopment: Approaching Europe, Growth,
Competitiveness and Integration’. The main
goals were (i) faster economic growth and
catching up, (ii) higher competitiveness,
(iii) inclusion in the European integration
framework, and (iv) permanent sustain-
ment of economic growth from the ecologi-
cal, social and ethnic standpoints.10
An informative account of the basis
for the strategy can be found in Svetlicic
(1997). It was noted first that fundamental
technological changes – the information
revolution and related changes – had made
small countries more viable; the external
environment was enhancing the effects of
smallness. This denied the argument that
globalization and the economies of scale
and scope mitigated against them. The vi-
ability of a small country in the globalized
                                                
10 The strategy’ is introduced briefly by Nakamura
(1995) and Majcen (1999).
economy depends much on its ability to
adapt swiftly to the changing external en-
vironment (Ibid., p. 3). On the one hand,
the weaknesses of small countries such as
Slovenia include a weak position in inter-
national relations, due to the scarce power
and natural resources, and inadequate la-
bour and local factor conditions. This is
coupled with an inability to realize econo-
mies of scale due to a small domestic mar-
ket, limited finance and R and D capacities,
etc. On the other hand, small countries
achieve social (cultural and religious) co-
hesion more easily. They have better im-
plemented policies and a more stable sys-
tem, escape costly international responsi-
bilities, adjust more radically and speedily,
and are better placed for specialization;
computerization and telecommunications
which are relatively more powerful weap-
ons for small firms and countries than for
large ones. He stressed despite their weak-
nesses and threats, small countries have
strengths and opportunities that surpass
them. A small domestic market is immate-
rial. The key is access to world markets.
Small countries like Slovenia need not have
a full set of industries. Instead, they should
find areas and niches of appropriate spe-
cialization and thoroughly internationalize
their activities.
3.2. Economic performance: costs
and benefits of secession and inde-
pendence
Slovenia experienced a ‘double transition,
from a socialist to a market economy and
from a regional economy to a national
economy’ (Mencinger 1996, p. 417). It had
the advantages of an early start in making
its market-oriented reforms within Yugo-
slavia (the first in the mid-1960s), main-
tained some advantages of its own, and
gained a better position than other former
socialist countries in implementing eco-
nomic reforms, adapting to ‘European val-
ues’ and adhering to sound economic poli-
cies. However, the early 1990s saw a
16
recession in Slovenia, as elsewhere in the
post-socialist region. This ‘transformational
recession’ has been explained by the Hun-
garian economist János Kornai as concomi-
tant on the transition from a supply-
constrained to a demand-constrained econ-
omy (Kornai 1995, p. 175). In the case of
Slovenia, the recession was comparatively
less serious, because the coordination of the
economy had for many years been decen-
tralized, and the impacts of insufficient de-
mand had already prevailed over those of
supply shortages in the 1980s, while most
exports were directed towards Western
Europe.
More serious were the costs caused by
secession and independence (Mencinger
1996, pp. 416–17). The Slovene economy
was badly hit by the secession itself, and
even more so, by the subsequent political
and economic developments in the rem-
nants of the Yugoslav Federation. The ‘sup-
ply shock’ added considerably to inflation-
ary pressures in the first months after inde-
pendence. Slovenia also suffered damage
because of hostile action against business
units in other republics, as the cross-
ownership pattern was asymmetric. In
1990, there were 2710 Slovene-owned
business units and 62 companies in other
republics, but only 690 units and 9 compa-
nies in Slovenia owned by interests in other
republics. Links with the rest of the world
were also hindered by unresolved responsi-
bilities for Yugoslav foreign debt and for-
eign-currency reserves, non-financial as-
sets, 2500 bilateral and multi-lateral
agreements on export quotas, transport li-
censes, etc. (Mencinger 1997, p. 209).
What struck hardest was near complete loss
of the Yugoslav market of 23 million peo-
ple. According to Mencinger’s estimates
(Ibid., p. 210), Slovenia lost 74.1 per cent of
its ‘normal’ exports to Yugoslavia, 18.8 per
cent of its ‘normal’ exports proper, and 45.2
per cent of its ‘normal’ total exports. As a
result, GDP declined in 1991 and 1992 by
8.9 and 5.5 per cent respectively. The un-
employment rate rose from 2.6 per cent in
1989 to 7.3 per cent in 1991 and 9.1 per
cent in 1993. The worst affected groups
were young job-seekers and the unskilled –
the 1993 unemployment rate for the 15–24
age group was 24.2 per cent (Svetlik 1997,
p. 218).
Table 5
Slovenia’s macroeconomic indicators
(1990–2000)
1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Real economy (% changes)
GDP -4.7 -5.5  2.8  5.3  4.1  3.5  4.6  3.8  4.9  5.1
Industry -10.5 -13.2 -2.8  6.4  2.0  1.0  1.0  3.7 -0.5 n.a.
Agriculture  1.6 -6.7 -4.2  4.2  1.6  1.1 -2.9  3.1  2.3 n.a.
GDP p. c. (USD mn) 8706 6280 6370 7231 9418 9439 9103 9793 10020 n.a.
Unemployment (an-
nual average %)  4.7  8.3  9.1  9.1  7.4  7.3  7.1  7.6  7.4 n.a.
Consumer prices (%
over previous year) 550 207.3 32.9 21.0 13.5  9.9  8.4  8.0  6.1  8.6
Government bal-
ance/GDP (%) -0.3  0.3  0.6 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -1.7 -1.4 -0.9 -1.0
Interest rates (%)
Deposit rate n.a. 48.3 30.2 27.9 20.8 11.2 13.9  7.0  9.6 n.a.
Lending rate n.a. 72.2 42.6 38.5 28.0 18.3 20.3 12.3 15.2 n.a.
External performance (USD mn)
Goods exports 4120 6683 6083 6832 8350 8353 8408 9091 8623 9054
Goods imports 4730 5892 6237 7168 9303 9178 9184 9880 9868 10016
Trade balance -610  791 -154  -336 -953 -825 -766 -789 -1245  -962
Current account 530  926  192  574 -100 31 12 -147 -783  -491
Current account
/GDP (%) n.a.  7.4  1.5  4.0 -0.5  0.2  0.1 -0.8 -3.9  -2.6
FDI net USD mn  0 113 111 131 183 188 340 250 144  50
Debt servic-
ing/exports of goods
& services (%)
n.a.  4.9  5.0  4.9  6.8  8.8  8.8 13.5  8.0  n.a.
Source: EBRD (2000), p. 213; data for 1990: EBRD (1997), p. 235.
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Slovene companies strove to divert
their exports to Western Europe. In 1992,
total exports increased by 33 per cent and
total imports by 28 per cent, but results in
1993 were far less impressive: exports
down 9 per cent and imports up 5.9 per
cent. The drastic decline in total exports was
caused mainly by the collapse of trade with
former Yugoslavia, which plunged by 37
per cent (from USD1508 million to USD963
million). Particularly important in this diffi-
cult period was the relative openness of the
German market (Mencinger 1997, pp.
211–14). The EU share of Slovenia’s total
exports rose from 60.9 per cent in 1992 to
67.2 per cent in 1995, while its import
share rose from 59.6 per cent to 68.9 per
cent in the same period. The driving force
behind Slovenian exports to the EU were
manufactures redirected from former
Yugoslav markets: footwear, chemicals,
textile, metalworking and paper. In the sec-
ond quarter of 1993, the economy bottomed
out, so that GDP increased by 2.5 per cent
over the year and has been growing since
(World Bank 1999b, p. 49).
Despite the pessimistic forecasts, the
Slovene economy seems to be competitive.
When the present author visited the country
in 1997, economists gave several explana-
tions. (i) Slovenian companies were striving
to modernize under the pressure from mar-
ket. (ii), Slovenia had inherited the entire EC
export quotas for former Yugoslavia. (iii) A
division of labour similar to the one be-
tween South-East Asia and Japan was devel-
oping with Germany and Austria. For ex-
ample, Slovene companies produced com-
ponents (such as car seats for BMW), and
other companies were making and export-
ing textiles under foreign brand names.
Four years after secession and inde-
pendence, ‘The benefits of secession appear
to prevail over its costs. Namely, while the
costs of re-orientating trade from protected
to competitive markets were significant, the
secession intensified economic restructur-
ing, produced sound economic policy, and
permitted the construction of a “normal”
economic system’ (Mencinger 1997, p.
213).
3.3. Restructuring and privatization
Preparations for privatization had begun at
the end of the Yugoslav period. The
amendment to the 1974 Constitution in No-
vember 1988 and related laws allowed
gradual transformation of socially owned
companies into mixed ones. Discount-price
‘internal shares’ enabled employee buy-
outs. In 1990, responsibility for privatiza-
tion was shifted to the republics. The first
draft programme for privatization in Slova-
kia was announced in November 1990.
There was heated controversy be-
tween advocates of two approaches. One
was styled gradual, decentralized, commer-
cial privatization, by which firms them-
selves initiated the process and the govern-
ment role was confined to regulation and
monitoring. ‘Gradual’ meant that the initial
privatization (by selling or issuing shares)
might be full or partial. ‘Commercial’ ruled
out any free distribution of shares by right,
although citizens of Slovenia would be enti-
tled to discounts on share purchases up to a
ceiling and there would be additional dis-
counts for employees of the unit being pri-
vatized. This approach was championed by
Joze Mencinger, in whose view there were
merits and lessons for future management
in the experience of self-management under
socialism.
The second group proposed mass,
centralized, distributive privatization. This
approach was represented by Jeffrey Sachs,
an economist noted for his eradication of
vicious inflation in South America and plans
for shock therapy drawn up for the gov-
ernments of Poland and Russia. In his view,
the political, social, and economic legacy
had to be eradicated. ‘Centralized’ meant
there was a big role for government in pri-
vatization, and ‘mass’ that enterprises were
to be immediately converted into joint-stock
companies by free distribution of shares to
the public.
The second privatization bill of No-
vember 1991 was voted down, but the Act
on the Transformation of Social Ownership
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was finally passed in November 1992. This
was a compromise between the strategies:
the decentralized, gradual approach of the
first and the predominantly distributive,
voucher privatization of the second
(Mencinger 1996, pp. 418–19).
Stiblar (1993, p. 185) summarizes the
privatization legislation as follows. (i) It
regulates the conversion of enterprises in
social ownership into firms with known,
private owners, while delineating the roles
of the Privatization Agency, the Reimburse-
ment Fund and the Pension Fund. (ii) Cer-
tain entities are excluded: public enter-
prises, banks, insurance companies, coop-
eratives, enterprises in bankruptcy proce-
dure. (iii) Social capital is defined in the law
as the difference between the assets and li-
abilities of social enterprises, plus perma-
nent investments and stocks in their posses-
sion. The value of social capital is estab-
lished by drawing up an ‘opening balance’,
by methods prescribed by the Privatization
Agency and Social Accounting Service. It is
not a book value, because it is usually far
from the real value. (iv) The rights of previ-
ous private (individual and corporate) own-
ers and their heirs are also prescribed. The
denationalization act called for restitution
of private property rights in kind (if possi-
ble) or value (shares) to those stripped of
ownership by the nationalization proceed-
ings of the post-war socialist regime. (v) All
agricultural land and forest in social own-
ership are transferred to the Fund for Agri-
cultural Land from the day of enactment.
Companies using and managing land may
continue to do so until an authorized body
decides on denationalization (restitution) or
concession.
In 1993, vouchers known as owner-
ship certificates were distributed free to all
Slovenian citizens. Unlike the vouchers in
Russia, these had different face values (be-
tween SIT 200,000 – DEM 2500 – and SIT
400,000) depending on the citizen’s age.
The total face value of the certificates dis-
tributed came to 40 per cent of the book
value of social capital on December 31,
1992. The certificates were not transferable,
but could be used to purchase shares in pri-
vatized companies (internal distributions,
buyouts and public issues) or investment
funds (World Bank 1999b, p. 88). The con-
version process affected almost 1500 so-
cially owned firms between 1993 and
1997. By November 1998, 1369 private
joint-stock companies were registered as
operating. The report by the World Bank
saw the strong self-management tradition in
Slovenia as an obstacle to privatization.
Most companies were controlled by insid-
ers. More than 90 per cent of firms chose to
transfer ownership through internal distri-
bution/buyout. In terms of capital value,
however, 26 per cent of the total was held
by insiders, 29 per cent by the state and 31
by institutions. Most insider buyouts took
place in labour-intensive small and me-
dium-sized firms. In 67 per cent of the ap-
proved programmes, employees acquired
more than half the company, but these
companies accounted for only 16 per cent
of national capital value. The shares in more
capital-intensive firms were offered to the
public for cash or certificates, subject to ap-
proval of the floatation by the Slovenian Se-
curity and Exchange Commission. Only 12
per cent of companies used public sale as
their preferred privatization method, but
these accounted for almost 30 per cent of
the total social capital. Slovenian citizens
were given pre-emptive rights in these is-
sues, so that sales to foreign investors were
limited (Ibid., p. 89). A noteworthy role was
still being played by the state. For example,
agricultural lands and forest previously
used by socially-owned firms were nation-
alized, as were public utilities and three
large banks and steelworks, which had been
bailed out. The public services in which the
state retained its participation included
power generation and distribution, trans-
portation, telecommunications and postal
services, water distribution and other mu-
nicipal services, and urban and environ-
mental infrastructure (Ibid., p. 90). By
1996, the private sector accounted for
about 40 per cent of GDP, which was well
below the proportions of over 60 per cent
found in other Central European transition
countries. Even in 1999, the private sector
was thought to be generating only 50–55
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per cent of GDP and employing about 50
per cent of the labour force.
3.4. Restructuring the financial sys-
tem
Slovenia had inherited a defective banking
system from former Yugoslavia, where es-
pecially under the 1974 Constitution, banks
gained a character of subordination to the
self-managed enterprises, which had
founded them in many cases.11 After the
independence of Slovenia, the financial
system including banks was essentially re-
structured. According to the report of the
World Bank (1999b), Slovenia’s banking
sector faced four major problems at the time
of independence. (i) Some 30–40 per cent
of bank loans were non-performing. (ii)
There was practically no competition in the
sector. (iii) The regulatory and supervisory
regime was lagging behind international
standards. (iv) Banks had lost assets in other
parts of former Yugoslavia (see Section 3.2).
Nevertheless, Slovene banks retained liabili-
ties, especially towards the London Club
creditors.
The authorities headed off the most
pressing bad-debt problem by nationalizing
three major banks and establishing a Bank
Rehabilitation Agency. The process began by
writing off current bank losses against
capital and replacing non-performing assets
with BRA-issued bonds to a total of DM 1.9
billion, which was equivalent to just under
10 per cent of
Slovenia’s 1993
GDP. The swap
removed two-
thirds of the bad
assets held by
banks. The
World Bank re-
port found it
paradoxical that public ownership in the
banking sector had significantly increased
                                                
11 See note 6.
during Slovenia’s transition to a market
economy and pointed to other problems
such as weak competition and high operat-
ing costs. The rehabilitation as such had
been successful and improved the sector’s
financial position significantly, but it was
expected that the restructuring would have
to continue (Ibid., pp. 65–68).
3.5. Recent tendencies
Having grown continually since 1993, the
Slovenian economy exceeded its 1990 out-
put level in 1996. In 1999, per capita GDP
equalled an exchange-rate USD10,109
equivalent to USD15,550 at purchasing-
power parity (WIIW 2001, p. 56). Equiva-
lent figures for the Czech Republic were
USD5305 and USD13,080 respectively
(Ibid., p. 42), so that Slovenia was by then
the richest of the transition countries.
Furthermore, it has been an economy
with both inward and outward flows of FDI.
According to Jaklic (2001), the first Slove-
nian OFDI occurred in 1951. Parallel with
the disintegration of former Yugoslavia,
many Slovenian companies became foreign
direct investors overnight. Exports were
complemented by more rapid expansion of
outward FDI, especially in the second half of
the 1990s. The stock of outward FDI
reached USD621 million at the end of
1999, which was equivalent to 23 per cent
of the inward FDI increment in that year.
Slovenia was already highly depend-
ent on foreign trade, but secession and in-
dependence increased this. Exports and im-
ports of goods and non-factor services ac-
count jointly for over 100 per cent of GDP.
Table 6
Slovenia’s outward stock and flows of FDI
(USD million)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Outward FDI stock 280.6 354.0 489.9 478.4 452.4 599.6 621
Net outward FDI flows 1.3 - 2.9 5.1 6.3 35.6 1.7 37.5
Outward FDI stock/GDP (%)  1.5 2 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.3 3.2
Source: Jaklic (2001), p. 387.
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For example, the share of exports of goods
and services in GDP in 1997 was 57.1 per
cent, and that of imports 58.3 per cent. Slo-
venia’s small open economy is therefore
vulnerable to external economic fluctua-
tions (World Bank 1999b, p. 5). Slovenia,
like other Central East European (CEE)
countries, is due to join the EU in 2004. Slo-
venia has still many problems in the field of
agriculture, social welfare, etc., associated
with the structural adjustment required by
the process of EU harmonization.
4) TRANSITION IN CROATIA
The transition in Croatia coincided with a
hard-fought independence war. The ini-
tially warm Western welcome for Croatia’s
independence rapidly cooled politically in
response to President Franko Tudjman’s
overtly nationalistic course. In 1991–5, fi-
nancial assistance from the EU was limited
to aid for humanitarian purposes.12 To-
wards the end of the 1990s, the Tudjman
regime encountered increasing public dis-
satisfaction and lost the general elections in
January 2000. A new Social Democrat-led
coalition embarked on economic restruc-
turing and efforts to promote EU member-
ship.
                                                
12 Continual discrimination and harassment of Croa-
tian Serbs culminated in a clearance of the Krajina
district by the Croatian army in August 1995 and
resettlement there of Bosnian Croats, in contraven-
tion of the Dayton Agreement of November 1995.
Under US pressure, the World Bank cancelled a
USD30 million loan for bolstering Croatia’s banking
system and the IMF also postponed a loan. Negotia-
tions for the country to join the World Trade Or-
ganization were suspended, under pressure from the
United States and the EU, and its negotiations to-
wards a cooperation agreement with the latter,
which began in June 1995, were suspended in
August. Although Croatia had been officially in-
cluded in June 1995 among the recipients under the
PHARE programme, that too was suspended in
August.
4.1. The Croatian economy after in-
dependence
Independence was obtained at no small cost.
War between the Croatian and Yugoslav
Federal armies began, but the conflict
moved mainly to Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Croatia became calm again. However, a
third of its territory came under Serbian
military rule and remained so until July
1995. Manufacturing was severely hit by
the war, with about a third of capacity
damaged (Fujimura, 1996, p. 77). GDP was
39 per cent lower in 1993 than in 1990.
The annual rate of inflation exceeded 1100
per cent in 1993 (Table 7).
The first stage of a two-stage stabili-
zation programme was introduced in Octo-
ber 1993, when the central bank tightened
monetary policy and liberalized the foreign-
exchange market, while the government
upped utility prices to eliminate subsidies
and placed controls on public-sector wages.
Within a year, inflation had calmed and
central-bank started to increase. The dinar
was replaced by a new currency, the kuna,
in May 1994. The second-stage structural
reforms were intended to produce long-
term economic stability, through fiscal re-
form, acceleration of privatization, re-
structuring of loss-making public-sector
enterprises, restructuring of the banking
system, and development of the financial
system (Jovancevic, 1999, pp. 240–41).
Croatia’s foreign-trade volume before
independence had amounted to 100 per
cent of its GDP (Samardzija 1997, p. 107).
Exports in 1990, including trade with other
Yugoslav republics and trade in material
services, was put at USD13.7 billion or
about two-thirds of GDP. This was more
than halved to USD5.7 billion in 1993, fol-
lowing the downturn in the economy, a
sharp fall in revenue from services, and the
loss of two neighbouring markets (Ibid., p.
35). Thereafter came rapid recovery, begin-
ning in 1994. However, wages began to
soar, increasing by almost 40 per cent in
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1995, presumably due to earlier adminis-
trative suppression. A consequent surge in
domestic demand brought a 44 per cent in-
crease in imports without real progress in
terms of GDP (Ibid., p. 104). Exports in
1995 covered only 62 per cent of imports,
as opposed to 93.7 per cent in 1973 and
86.3 per cent in 1988 (Statisticki Godisnjak
Jugoslavije 1989, pp. 325 and 418).
The partner structure of foreign trade
shifted steadily towards Western Europe
(Samardzija 1997, pp. 106–9). In 1992, the
EU took 52.45 per cent of Croatia’s exports,
former Yugoslavia 31.97 per cent, and CEE
and ex-Soviet countries 5.79 per cent. By
1995, the EU share had increased to 58 per
cent, while former Yugoslavia’s was 23 per
cent and the CEE and ex-Soviet group 9 per
cent. With imports, the EU supplied 46.79
per cent in 1992, former Yugoslavia 23.24
per cent, and the CEE and ex-Soviet coun-
tries 13.58 per cent, as opposed to 62.16,
11.31 and 9.31 respectively in 1995. A
breakdown by countries shows that first
place for exports in 1985 went to Italy
(23.7 per cent), followed by Germany (21.5
per cent), Slovenia (13.1 per cent), Bosnia-
Herzegovina (8.3 per cent), Austria (4.3 per
cent), Russia (3.3 per cent), France (2.4 per
cent), Liberia (2.3), the United States (1.8
per cent) and the Netherlands (1.7 per
cent). In the same year, the first place in
Croatia’s imports went to Germany (20.1
per cent), followed by Italy (18.2 per cent),
Slovenia (10.7 per cent), Austria (7.7 per
cent), the UK (6.1 per cent), the United
States (2.7 per cent), Libya (2.5 per cent),
France (2.5 per cent), the Netherlands (2.3
per cent) and Switzerland (2.2 per cent).
Nowadays, implementation of the sec-
ond stage is criticized (Croatian Chamber of
Economy 2000, p. 2). The violent inflation
was rapidly controlled in 1993–4 and in
this regard, the stabilization programme
was a success, as Ivan Teodorovic (2001,
pp. 276–7) concedes. However, he criticizes
the second stage because an ‘economic pol-
icy that allowed for increasing domestic
Table 7
Croatia’s macroeconomic indicators
(1992–2000)
1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Real economy (% changes)
GDP -6.7 -11.7 -8.0 5.9 6.8 6.0 6.5 2.5 -0.9 3.7
Industry -11.7 -14.6 -6.0 -2.6 0.3 3.1 6.8 3.7 -1.4 n.a.
Agriculture -2.9 -13.5 4.5 -0.3 0.7 1.3 4.0 10.2 n.a n.a.
GDP p. c. (USD mn) 5106 2291 2349 3137 4029 4422 4396 4806 4456 4227
Unemployment (annual
average, %) 9.3 13.2 14.8 14.5 14.5 10.0* 9.9 11.4 13.6 n.a.
Consumer prices (% over
previous year) 610 666 1518 97.6 2.0 3.5 3.6 5.7 4.2 6.5
Government bal-
ance/GDP (%) n.a. -3.9 -0.8 1.2 -1.4 -1.0 -1.4 -0.4 -6.2 -6.7
Interest rates (%)
Deposit rate n.a. 435 27.4 5.0 6.1 4.2 4.4 4.1 4.3 n.a.
Lending rate n.a. 2333 59.0 15.4 22.3 18.5 14.1 16.1 16.1 n.a.
External performance (USD mn)
Goods exports 4020 3127 3904 4260 4633 4546 4210 4605 4372 4590
Goods imports 5190 3430 4646 5432 7900 8236 9435 8773 7674 7904
Trade balance -1170 -303 -742 -1172 -3267 -3690 -5224 -4169 -3302 -3313
Current account 1050 326 606 826 -1451 -1148 -2343 -1550 -1537 -798
Current account /GDP
(%) n.a. 3.2 5.6 5.7 -7.7 -5.8 -11.6 -7.1 -7.6 -4.1
FDI, net (USD mn) n.a. n.a. 120.3 117.3 120.8 515.9 550.7 1013 1635 1125.8
Debt servicing/exports of
goods & services (%) n.a. 8.8 9.7 8.9 9.6 8.9 10.0 13.1 14.4 n.a.
Source: EBRD (2000), p. 153; Data for 1990: EBRD (1997), p. 220. Note: *This sharp fall in unemploy-
ment, strange at a time when demobilized soldiers were appearing on the labour market, points to a
change in methodology. Jovancevic (1999, p. 246) puts the jobless rate at 16.4 per cent in 1996, 17.5
per cent in 1997, 17.6 per cent in 1998 and 19.0 per cent in 1999.
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consumption and rising foreign debt in
hand with a softening of the budget con-
straint had to end up with a softening of the
entire fiscal system. Thus, a slowing down
and in some aspects the reversal of the re-
form process had threefold effects: stagnant
growth rates, increasing unemployment and
social differentiation.’
4.2. Economic restructuring and
‘state-dominated’ privatization
The privatization legislation of April 1991
defined permissible procedures and a gen-
eral framework. Two supplementary pieces
of legislation permitted direct state in-
volvement in any sector. The main charac-
teristics of privatization strategy in Croatia
were (i) nationalization of social capital, of
which the state became owner of 80 per
cent. (ii) The government had a prominent
role and extensive discretionary powers in
the privatization of re-nationalized firms.
(iii) Instead of an Eastern European-style
voucher scheme, there was a system of dis-
counts on share purchases, with priority for
employees. (iv) The privation was ‘revenue-
oriented’ (Bicanic 1993, p. 426). A plainer
explanation was given by Kalogjera (1993,
p. 63), who described it as one of basic pri-
vatization objectives to obtain funds neces-
sary to repay public debt and assist financ-
ing recovery.
Criticism of the power privatization
gave to the state came from two senior
Croatian economists. Noting that former
Yugoslavia’s shift from a command econ-
omy towards a market economy had begun
in Croatia in 1950–52, where 60 per cent
of prices had been liberalized over eight
years, Branko Horvat (1999) called the
1990s privatization a backward transition.
Similarly, Dragomir Vojnic (1999, p. 17), in
a keynote speech at an international confer-
ence in 1999, said his country had ‘only
exploited market tradition to a certain de-
gree’ and ‘the process of circulation and
concentration of capital did not develop on
the basis of entrepreneurship and entrepre-
neurial capability, but on the basis of politi-
cal fitness’.
On the political side, the Tudjman re-
gime and the Croatian Democratic Union
(HDZ) held power from 1990 to 2000,
thanks to a constituency system that had
given the HDZ 65 per cent of the parlia-
mentary seats with 48 per cent of the poll.
The main opposition party was different in
each election (communists in 1990, liberals
in 1992, and yet another party in 1996).
This, ironically, gave the political system a
kind of stability.13 According to Puhovski
(1999, p. 20), ‘All the really important de-
cisions are made in some kind of court
around President Tudjman, officially called
the National Defence and Security Council.’
4.3. The privatization process
The Privatization Agency and the Develop-
ment Fund set up in 1991 inherited the le-
gal framework of the Yugoslav Federation.
The role of the Privatization Agency was to
check the submitted plans and supervise
and monitor the privatization process. The
proceeds went to the Development Fund.
The Privatization Agency had the power to
install managers in loss-making enterprises.
The Development Fund was free of direct
accountability and its portfolio of shares in
almost all companies made it the biggest
owner of assets and a market maker on the
nascent stock exchange. For firms it owned,
it appointed managers and could initiate
privatization when and how it saw fit. The
two organizations merged as the Croatian
Fund for Privatization in January 1993 (Bi-
canic 1993, pp. 422–8).
Privatization itself involved three
rounds of share sales and allocations to de-
velopment and pension funds. The first
round was a discount sale of shares to em-
ployees, the second a full-price sale, again
to employees, and the third a non-
                                                
13 Author’s interview with Ivan Grdesic, Faculty of
Political Science, Zagreb, July 9, 1997.
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discounted sale to the public. Shares in the
first two rounds could be purchased in in-
stalments over periods of up to five years.
The biggest discounts went to employees
buying into firms that employed them,
awarded on transactions up to a ceiling of
DEM 20,000 per individual, contingent on
mode of payment and years of service.
Shares sold in the first round could not ex-
ceed 50 per cent of the total estimated assets
of the company (Ibid., p. 433).
Managerial buyouts were apparently
preferred in the actual privatization, but
Bicanic has pointed to problems in this re-
gard, referring to ‘the frequency and form
of bending the rules and breaking the law’.
The most frequent dodges were ‘manager
loans’, ‘manager’s insurance schemes’, and
‘ghost buyers on one side and undervalued
assets on the other’ (Ibid., p. 435). The pref-
erential loans to managers received from
banks (whose managers were established
business partners or even friends) were for
up to DEM 10,000. Banks might accept as
collateral the shares themselves, overvalued
real estate, or frozen ‘foreign-currency
savings deposits’ (Ibid., p. 435; Kalogjera
1993, p. 81). Sometimes the company in-
volved would pay high insurance premiums
on its managers’ behalf, which they then
cashed in at a discount to finance their
share purchases. In other cases, workers
would be paid to act as ghost buyers of
shares at large discounts and sell on to
managers. Managerial buyouts were com-
mon. However, legislation facilitated under-
valuing and incorrectly valuing assets – for
example, location was not considered or
book value used in spite of inflation. Man-
agers were not the only ones breaking and
bending the rules. The Privatization Agency
was often accused of using privatization
legislation for non-economic (mostly politi-
cal) goals. Noted examples mentioned by
Bicanic (1993, p. 436) were replacement of
managers with party faithful in Istria, at-
tempts to influence the media by putting
independent dailies and weeklies into re-
ceivership, and preventing employee buy-
outs to ensure that the state retained major-
ity control.
4.4. Privatization stalemate
Privatization in Croatia came to a standstill
in 1997. According to research by a Hun-
garian research organization Kopint-Datorg
(ET 6: 3, pp. 176–7), the deficiency was that
privatization had not been extended to the
banking sector, energy industry, public
utilities or arms industry. The most wide-
spread method was sale of half the share
capital to employees at a discounted price.
Most unprivatized equity was handled by
the Privatization Fund. Other holdings were
controlled by the pension funds, while 5 per
cent was being used for compensation.
Small and medium-sized companies were
purchased by employees and management
using preferential credits. The large compa-
nies, which were nationalized first, came
under the management of cronies of the
ruling party. According to Kalogjera, ‘Every
privatization sale is carried out [in a way]
favourable to a ruling party.’14 In Croatia’s
case, where Tudjman and the HDZ were
firmly in power from April 1990 to January
2000, the evil is evident.
It was officially declared in 1997 that
50 per cent of all firms had been privatized,
but Kalogjera was sceptical. In fact, he ar-
gued, 80 per cent were in the hands of the
state or under state control. Zakosek (1996,
p. 93) reported that about 560,000 share-
holders (12 per cent of Croatia’s popula-
tion) in various companies, including em-
ployees and managers, had emerged out of
the privatization process. The limiting fea-
tures were (a) ineffective capital markets,
(b) negligible foreign investments, (c) lack
of domestic capital, and (d) the fact that the
main privatization transactions were still
handled by the state, not the stock market.
Vojnic (1999, pp. 17–20) saw hundreds of
thousands of small shareholders plundered,
despite the formal rights given by the law,
because of their restricted ability to pay for
                                                
14 Author’s interview with Drazen Kalogjera, Zagreb,
July 10, 1997.
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their shares. Wealth was being concen-
trated into the hands of a small number of
tycoons supported by the ruling structures.
The deviancy involved a broad range from
mass small crime, bribery and corruption,
up to organized crime permeating various
levels of the economy and society. Vojnic
used expressions like ‘maffiocracy’, ‘savage
capitalism’ and ‘primitive accumulation’ in
his criticism of privatization practice in
Croatia, adding that a previously relatively
developed middle class, the foundation of
civil society, had almost disappeared. He
drew parallels with the situation in Russia,
and blamed the deviancy on World Bank
and IMF advisers and their concept of
‘Washington Consensus’.
4.5. Reorganizing the banking system
According to Jovancevic (1999, p. 241), the
break-up of the Yugoslav monetary system
technically made the Croatian banks insol-
vent. Large amount of banks claims on the
National Bank of Yugoslavia became im-
possible to collect and private foreign-
currency deposits have been frozen since
1991. Numerous companies found them-
selves in serious difficulties, unable to repay
their debts to banks. The government
therefore recapitalized a number of major
companies by issuing treasury ‘big bonds’ as
a debt-repaying instrument.
The real increase in fixed assets from
domestic sources was very small in the
1990s, for several reasons. (i) Except in
1995–7, the deposit rate has been lower
than the inflation rate (Table 7), so that the
marginal propensity to save has been small.
(ii) High exchange rates have not encour-
aged industry to export, so that the volume
of production has remained low relative to
the size of domestic market, with high fixed
costs per unit of production. The profits on
domestic manufacturing and services have
been low, so that corporate savings have
also remained low. (iii) The limited domes-
tic funds have made capital (i.e. interest
rates) expensive. For instance, the lending
rate in 1995 was 22.3 per cent against an
annual inflation rate of only 6.1 per cent.
This may also have pointed to inefficiency
in the banking system. (iv) Capital markets
have functioned sluggishly, making it hard
for firms to finance investment through eq-
uity and impeding modernization of pro-
duction (Ibid., pp. 255–6).
This meant that the Croatian economy
badly needed foreign direct investment, but
the inflow was small until the mid-1990s
(Table 7), due to Croatian distaste for it and
the government’s poor foreign relations
(Croatian Chamber of Economy 2000, p. 2).
Croatia and the FR Yugoslavia eventually
accorded each other diplomatic recognition
in April 1996, which was much welcomed
internationally (Samardzija 1997, p. 24). In
early 1997, Croatia received its first credit
rating from three major agencies, indicating
the arrival of peace and reconstruction and
the end of a period of extreme political risk
(Jovancevic 1999, p. 242).
Table 8
Banks according to type of ownership
Banks 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
State-owned  21  19  15  15  9  9
Private  5  32  39  43  51  51
Total banks  26  51  54  58  60  60
Source: Jovancevic (1999), p. 242.
Rehabilitation of Croatia’s banks was
facilitated by participation from foreign
banks. The process started in 1996 with
four large banks (Slavonska, Splitska, Ri-
jecka and Privredna banka). Hitherto, the
banking system had remained concentrated,
with a small number controlling a relatively
large proportion of total assets and reve-
nues. The existing banks were privatized
and new private banks were established
(Table 8). Whereas only one bank had en-
tered the Croatian market before 1996, six
foreign banks opened branches or subsidi-
aries between late 1996 and 1997, which
helped to intensify competition. By 1998,
the majority of the banks (85 per cent, with
70.2 per cent of the total banking assets)
were predominantly privately owned. The
other nine banks (with 29.8 per cent of the
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total assets) were wholly or state owned
(Ibid., pp. 241–3). The intensified competi-
tion sent some banks out of business, in-
cluding four in 1998 (Dubrovacka, Zu-
panska, Glumina and Gradska), which held
huge amounts of bad debt (Ibid., p. 257).
4.6. The Croatian economy in the
second half of the 1990s
The economy started to recover in 1994,
recording growth rates of about 6 per cent
in 1995–7. The best performance was
shown by construction, which was closely
related to reconstruction of war damage.
However, the Croatian economy had not
recovered its 1990 level even by 1998,
when it recorded negative growth in the
second half of the year.
The shortage of domestic funds and
the difficulties for companies in obtaining
bank loans have been mentioned already. So
has the very small amount of FDI up to
1995 – a per capita figure much smaller
than the ones for other CEE countries.
Capital investment in manufacturing and
services has also been low in the final years
of the federation, so that technologies in
Croatia had become obsolete. Having been
the world’s third biggest ship-builder, pro-
ducing mainly for the world market, the
state-owned shipyards were allowed to
stagnate and lose their international com-
petitiveness after independence. Croatia is
now only the thirteenth largest shipbuilder
in the world (Horvat 1999, p. 55; BCE, May
2000, p. 30).
On January 1, 1998, sales tax was re-
placed by a value-added tax. The annual
report of the Ministry of Finance denied this
had any negative impact on economic
growth, since it had reduced the tax rate
from 26.5 to 22 per cent while successfully
drawing much of the informal economy
into the tax net and so increasing overall
tax revenue. Instead, the annual report
mentioned the financial crisis in East Asia,
saying that negative perceptions of investors
and increased sensibility to risk in the sec-
ond half of 1997 had curbed FDI in transi-
tion countries (Republic of Croatia, Ministry
of Finance 1999, pp. 9–14). GDP fell by 0.8
per cent in the fourth quarter of 1998, ac-
cording to the report because of worsening
credit availability on domestic and foreign
markets, high costs of capital, difficulties in
collecting outstanding debts, decreased
growth rates in domestic demand, and a
levelling of tourist consumption (Ibid., p.
11). This explanation may cover the short-
term changes, but the underlying cause was
loss of development impetus, due to struc-
tural problems such as decreased competi-
tiveness, delay in restructuring enterprises
and the banking sector, and swelling public
expenditure. Employment fell by 3.2 per
cent in the first quarter of 1999 and the un-
employment rate jumped from 18.6 per
cent in December 1998 to 19.6 per cent in
March 1999. The recession also worsened
the position of the central budget. Having
registered a surplus in the previous year,
the budget showed a deficit to 1837 million
kuna in the first quarter of 1999. To pre-
vent further deterioration, the government
approved a restrictive package in May
1999, clipping 3.5 billion kuna off public
spending. Meanwhile a spate of banking
failures meant that large sums had to be
spent on topping up the deposit insurance
fund and reducing the deficit of the welfare
funds. Monetary policy also had to be tight-
ened (ET Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 129–30).
Both exports and imports declined in
1999. Exports were down to USD4.27 bil-
lion (5.8 per cent less than in 1998). Im-
ports amounted to USD7.77 billion (i.e. 7.2
per cent less than in 1998). Although the
trade deficit decreased slightly (USD345
million), it was still USD3.49 billion. The
weak trade performance was ascribed to the
absence of a preferential trading agreement
with the EU, the customs border that came
into effect with Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
the slow start to the structural moderniza-
tion of industry (ET Vol. 9, No.1, p. 39).
For a long time, Croatia’s large deficits
in goods trading had been offset by the sur-
plus in services and remittances from work-
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ers abroad. These were both affected badly
by the events in the Balkans. By the autumn
of 1998, tensions between Yugoslavia and
Nato were rising over Kosovo, and between
March and June the following year, Nato
made air attacks on Yugoslavia. Although
Croatia was not in the war zone, the attacks
involved overflying by Nato planes from
bases in Italy and the Adriatic, which dis-
couraged tourists from visiting the Adriatic
coast and halved revenue from tourism.
This and a fall in transportation led to a
drastic worsening of the services balance.
Accumulated external debt doubled in four
years from USD3699 million in 1994 to
USD8489 million in 1999 (Republic of
Croatia, Ministry of Finance 1999, p. 97).
By September 1999, debt had reached
USD9.3 billion, of which USD1.7 billion
was due for repayment by 2000 (Hrvatski
1999, p. 5).
There was also a mounting problem
with debts between firms. According to data
from the Institution for Payment Transac-
tions, this amounted to 23.3 billion kuna in
June 1999, which was 7.3 per cent higher
than in the previous month. The total in
August 1999 was almost 62 per cent or 8.9
billion kuna more than in late 1998 (Ibid.,
p. 7).
Consolidated state spending rose from
40.5 per cent of GDP in 1994, to 47.9 per
cent in 1998, when it was expected to rise
to 49.1 per cent. Adding in local authorities
to government spending and non-budget
funds, total public spending came to 70 per
cent of GDP (Croatian Chamber of Economy
2000, p. 9). The biggest share of central-
government budgetary expenditure in 1997
went to defence (20.32 per cent), followed
by social security and welfare affairs and
services (18.76 per cent), public-order and
safety affairs (12.12 per cent), education
(11.78 per cent), and transport and com-
munications (9.98 per cent). The biggest
item in the 1999 budget was social security
and welfare affairs and services (23.07 per
cent), followed by defence (12.88 per cent),
education (12.56 per cent), transport and
communications (11.65 per cent), and
public-order and safety affairs (9.73 per
cent). Spending on defence and public order
decreased, but their shares in the state
budget remained high. Of the non-budget
funds, the most important were pensions
and health. Deficits in the non-budget funds
were covered by transfers from the central
budget, of which 50.8 per cent went to the
pension fund in 1998 and 13.9 per cent to
the health fund (Republic of Croatia, Min-
istry of Finance 1999, pp. 47–8). By March
1999, the number of retired was nearly one
million out of a population of 4.6 million, so
that the ration of active to retired was 1.6:1
in 1999, as opposed to 3.2: 1 in 1990 (Ibid.,
p. 19). In this respect, the working pro-
gramme of the new government criticized
problems such as a lack of discipline in
payment of pension and health contribu-
tions, recognition of claims regardless of
financial conditions, and very uneven rights
(Government of the Republic of Croatia
2000, p. 4). Budget expenditure had to be
trimmed before a stand-by credit agreement
could be reached with the IMF. Reforms of
the pension and health systems became in-
evitable as transfers from the central budget
could not be maintained. Similarly, an
agreement had to be reached with social
partners on limiting wage and price in-
creases. As a result of all this, Croatian
economy came to a standstill towards the
end of the 1990s (ET Vol. 9, No.1, pp. 39–
40).
4.7. Political changes
The economic difficulties showed that
Tudjman’s methods had failed. The public
had become dissatisfied with the way Tud-
jman’s adherents had amassed wealth while
many people became impoverished. As a
regional journal reported early in 1999,
‘Opinion polls credit [Tudjman’s] ruling
party––the badly divided Croatian Demo-
cratic Union (HDZ) – with a dismal 20 per
cent level of support. Worse, the man him-
self has dropped from the second most re-
spected person in the country in January
last year, to a pathetic 35th place now’
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(BCE, February 1999). Few foreign states-
men chose to attend Tudjman’s funeral in
December 1999. The HDZ won only 40 of
the 151 seats in Parliament (24.38 per cent
of the vote) in the general elections of Janu-
ary 3, 2000. A centre-left union of the So-
cial Democratic Party and the Social Liberal
Party won 71 seats (40.84 per cent of the
vote), and a centre-right union 24 seats,
which decided to support a coalition gov-
ernment from outside. The three main can-
didates in the presidential election on Janu-
ary 24, 2000 were former Foreign Minister
Mate Granic (HDZ), Drazen Budisa of the
centre–left union and Stjepan Mesic of the
centre-right union, a one-time president of
former Yugoslavia, who won with 56.21
per cent of the vote in a run-off poll on
February 7.15
The new prime minister was Ivica Ra-
can, last leader of League of Communists of
Croatia and leader of the Social Democratic
Party. His programme, based on the public
commitments of the coalition groups, was
one of change aimed at building a civil soci-
ety and a democratic, market-oriented state
integrated into the EU. One of the main
tasks was to change the political system by
reducing the powers of the president and
strengthening the role of Parliament and the
government. Other tasks were the promo-
tion of dialogue and tolerance, establishing
an independent judiciary and the rule of
law; turning Croatian Television into a
public, independent, responsible medium,
etc. The new government set out to take
Croatia into the WTO and CEFTA and gain
associate membership of the EU (Govern-
ment of the Republic of Croatia 2000).
Prime Minister Racan called on the
leaders of state enterprises and institutions
to resign, so as to wind up Tudjman’s eco-
nomic estate (ET Vol. 9, No.1, p. 38). The
new government broke with the nationalis-
tic course of its predecessor. This was ex-
emplified by a cooperative position towards
the International Tribunal in the Hague on
                                                
15 To’o Fairu No.521–2, pp. 4–5, Niigata Nippoh
February 9, 2000, and other Japanese newspaper
reports.
war criminals in the former Yugoslavia.
Leaders of the West welcomed the new gov-
ernment and tried to put a rapid end to the
country’s international isolation.16 In June
2000, Nato invited Croatia to participate in
its Partnership for Peace. Meanwhile there
were negotiations with the IMF about a new
loan. In July 2000, Croatia was admitted to
the WTO. Relations with the EU improved
and an Agreement on Stabilization and As-
sociation was reached in October 2001.
4.8. Challenges for Croatia
Economic restructuring had been inconsis-
tent under the Tudjman regime. The gov-
ernment that took office in 2000 faced tasks
that included first of all painful public-
spending cuts (e.g. reductions in govern-
ment employees and their remuneration,
cuts in subsidies, and reform of the pension
and health systems, etc.) Also urgent were
promoting exports, attracting FDI, restruc-
turing business and banks, improving the
capital market, accelerating privatization
and opening it to foreign investors, sup-
porting agriculture, cutting unemployment,
introducing minimum social protection, and
so on. Moreover, there were 46,000 dis-
placed persons and 140,000 refugees from
Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia-
Herzegovina to take care of (Government of
the Republic of Croatia 2000; Croatian
Chamber of Economy 2000).
According to Borozan and Barkovic
(2002), 2650 companies had been involved
in privatization in the first decade (1991–
9). In 1991, the Privatization Fund
managed a state-owned portfolio worth 86
billion kuna, of which assets worth 3.8
billion kuna remained unprivatized in
1999. Many privatized businesses were
                                                
16 BCE (June 2000, p. 43) reported, ‘Mr Racan has
handed over sensitive documents to the International
Criminal Tribunal on war crimes in former Yugosla-
via, despite threats from war veterans to disrupt the
all-important tourist season. He has also invited to
UN officials to Croatia to investigate mass graves,
prompting criticism from war veterans.’
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privatized businesses were ruined under the
management of Croatian ‘tycoons’, who
returned the shares to the Privatization
Fund in that year, dramatically increasing
its portfolio again. By September 2001, it
held stock in 1203 firms with a combined
share capital of 63.6 billion kuna, in which
the state holding was 25.5 billion kuna.
Most of the portfolio was unattractive to
investors due to high indebtedness of com-
panies, insolvency, technical obsolescence,
and inappropriate manpower structures.
Only about 100 companies in industry, in-
surance and tourism proved attractive
enough to obtain FDI.
FDI, having remained low in the first
half of 1990s, began to increase in 1996,
reaching USD1.6 billion in 1999 (Table 7),
when 35 per cent of Croatian Telecom was
sold to Deutsche Telekom for USD850 mil-
lion (followed in 2001 by another 16 per
cent for USD422 million). Also in 1999, 66
per cent of Privredna Banka Zagreb was
sold to Banca Comerciale Italiana. The cu-
mulative FDI over the 1993–2001 period
was USD66.4 billion, with Austria as the
biggest investor (27.23 per cent), followed
by Germany (25.81 per cent), the United
States (18.17 per cent), Luxembourg (5.59
per cent) and the Netherlands (3.63 per
cent). As for the sectoral structure, the big-
gest draws were telecommunications (29.37
per cent), banking (17.26), pharmaceuti-
cals (15.41), cement (5.05), petroleum and
gas (3.11), hotels and catering (2.66),
commerce (1.67), bricks, roof tiles, etc.
(1.53) and brewing (1.35). FDI in manu-
facturing (except pharmaceuticals) has
been small and in tourism unexpectedly so.
These will have to attract more foreign
capital. Borozan and Barkovic (2002) note
that ‘blue-field’ (sea-related) investment is
the most profitable, but has been officially
neglected and ignored so far.
To attract more FDI and activate busi-
ness, it is indispensable to improve the in-
vestment climate. The communications
technology and transport infrastructure
need improving. There are still administra-
tive barriers to flows of FDI. Foreign busi-
ness people often encounter lengthy proce-
dures, such as application for entry visas
and work permits of foreign managers and
workers, company registration and other
procedures for founding a business, busi-
ness-location problems such as land acqui-
sition, construction permits, usage permit
for utility services, etc. These are often per-
ceived as ‘administrative harassment’ (Ibid.
2002). Here the more active attitude of
Hungary towards FDI could be instructive.
Croatia aspires to join the EU by 2007,
but progress seems uneven. Like other can-
didates, Croatia will have to introduce the
acquis communautaire, revise its domestic
legal system and harmonize its economy,
which is a time and energy-consuming pro-
cess. Bartlett (2002) points out that late en-
trants may be at a disadvantage compared
with CEE and Baltic countries due to accede
in 2004. Latecomers may face higher non-
tariff barriers, restricted access to European
labour markets, and fiercer competition
from new members. EU supports are valu-
able to Croatia, but the amounts received
have been modest. In connection with the
Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe, the
EU offers the CARDS programme to replace
PHARE for the Western Balkans, including
Croatia, with political rather than economic
aims. It complements EBRD and World Bank
support, and is geared towards fields such
as democratization, return of refugees,
fights against organized crime, and security
of borders (Ibid., p. 11). Although Croatia
has the Adriatic coast, as a superlative tour-
ist attraction, it would find it very difficult
to adopt Norway’s approach to the EU.17 It
will therefore continue for many years with
its efforts to satisfy the conditions for the EU
membership.
                                                
17 Intent on keeping its earnings from North Sea oil
to itself, Norway has found non-member association
with the EU a satisfactory arrangement. Iceland takes
the same position for fear of adverse effects on its
fishing revenues from the EU Common Fishery Policy
(Bartlett 2002, p. 14).
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5) COLLAPSE AND A DIFFICULT
REBIRTH IN THE NEW YUGOSLAV
ECONOMY
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ex-
perienced two wars and two post-war re-
coveries in a decade. The civil war in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina, which broke out in April
1992 and ended with the Dayton Accord in
November 1995, led to economic sanctions
being imposed on Yugoslavia from May
1992 till November 1995. The two events
caused losses of USD50–60 billion and re-
pairing this vast economic damage – or just
returning to 1990 levels – is expected to
take at least 10 to 15 years’ (Business
Europe September/October 1996, pp. 7–8).
Inflation on the astronomical scale of
the late 1980s recurred. The monthly rate
peaked in January 1994 at 310 million per
cent. This was triggered by excessive public
consumption due (i) to 700,000 refugees in
Serbia and Montenegro and aid given to
Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia (ii) a bloated,
bureaucratic Federal administration inher-
ited from former Yugoslavia, (iii) military
expenditure equalling 10 per cent of social
product (iv) high pension costs, and v)
budgetary support to loss-making sectors
(Mitrovic-Israel, 1997, pp. 470–71).
Economic activity sharply declined.
The year-on growth rate of social product
(a category similar to GDP) was –8.4 per
cent in 1990, –11.2 per cent in 1991, –26.1
per cent in 1992 and –30.3 per cent in
1993. A drastic fall in the supply of goods
led to widespread shortages, which contrib-
uted further to price increases. Hyperinfla-
tion was also stoked by mechanisms of the
grey money supply peculiar to Yugoslavia.
As the new Yugoslav Federation inherited a
decentralized central-banking system, there
was more than one decision-making entity.
Monetary policy became unclear and its
implementation ill-coordinated, which led
to excessive money-supply levels (Ibid., p.
472). The fall in output was mainly due to
the UN sanctions, but also to the hyperin-
flation – industrial output stabilized after it
ended, which was well before sanctions
were lifted. The decline in output was ac-
companied by a decline in living standards.
Per capita GDP in 1993 was half what it
had been in 1991.
The hyperinflation was curbed by the
implementation of the Avramovic Pro-
gramme (Programme of Reconstruction of
the Monetary System and the Strategy of
Economic Recovery of Yugoslavia), which
amounted to two-phase shock therapy. The
first phase was similar to the shock therapy
implemented by Ante Markovic government
on January 1, 1990, which the second
phase included elements of drastic reform.
Phase 1, which started on January 24,
1994, was intended mainly to halt inflation
and stimulate output. It included introduced
a new dinar pegged at parity with the Ger-
man mark (DEM), convertible for firms and
individuals, and with the money supply
backed by foreign-exchange reserves. This
monetary system was based on the so-called
currency-board system. Implementation
apparently halted the hyperinflation
stopped almost overnight (Mitrovic-Israel
1997, pp. 477–8).
The currency-board system could be
maintained for only six months. Before
long, financial discipline loosened and the
emission of currency based on borrowing
from the central bank was resumed. Prices
began to rise again (the inflation rate in
1995 was 120 per cent), and the gap be-
tween official and black-market exchange
rates on official market and black market
has expanded. The dinar was devalued in
November 1995 to an official exchange rate
of YUD 3.3 to DEM 1.
Phase 2 included correlating primary
currency emission with foreign exchange
reserves. Interest rates were to reflect mar-
ket demand and the limited supply of cur-
rency. State monopolies in foreign trade and
industry were ended and privatization be-
gun. With few exceptions; quotas on ex-
ports and imports were removed and tariffs
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reduced. These radical reforms proposed by
Dragoslav Abramovic, then governor of the
National Bank of Yugoslavia, met with con-
siderable resistance from much of the ex-
isting industrial and political power struc-
ture (Ibid., p. 479). He had already clashed
with the government over his unwillingness
to ease monetary policy, his advocacy of
speedy, unconditional Yugoslav member-
ship of the IMF and the World Bank, and his
support for privatization. Eventually, he was
dismissed from his post by the Federal Par-
liament on May 15, 1996 and implementa-
tion of Phase 2 was neglected.
5.1. Frustrated privatization
The process of privatization has been very
slow, with the equity, in most cases, being
sold at preferential prices to employees and
managers of the company concerned. About
2034 registered socially owned firms (45
per cent of the total) were sold off in 1990–
94. More than half a million employees –
75 per cent of those employed in such en-
terprises – subscribed and were allocated
shares. The privatization affected. 44 per
cent of the total socially owned capital.
Thereafter, an additional 42 per cent of so-
cially owned capital was privatized, in-
cluding mainly public infrastructure and
Table 9
Macroeconomic indicators for FR Yugoslavia
(1990–2000)
1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Real economy (% changes)
GDP -7.9 4.3 6.1 5.8 7.4 2.5 -21.9 7.0
Industry -12.3 2.1 3.8 8.0 9.5 3.6 -23.1 11.2
Utilization of industrial ca-
pacity (%)* n.a. 36.2 37.6 40.3 44.2 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Agriculture -7.0 n.a. 4.1 n.a. 7.3 -3.2 -0.9 -19.7
GDP p. c. (USD at exchange
rate) 2696 n.a. 1449 n.a. 1712 1742 1424 940
Personal consumption/GDP
(%)* n.a. 64 67 73 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Govt consumption/GDP (%)* n.a. 21 21 22 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a
Fixed investment/GDP (%) n.a. 13 12 12 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Unemployment (%) 20.3 23.1 24.7 25.8 25.5 25.4 25.5 26.8
Consumer prices (% of previ-
ous year) 579.7 n.a. 57.7 n.a. 21.6 29.9 44.9 85.6
Government balance/GDP
(%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -7.0 -6.1 n.a. n.a.
Money and credit (% change)
M2* n.a.. n.a. 42.6 75.3 61.6 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Dinar credits of banking sys-
tem* n.a. n.a. 68.4 100.6 44.8 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Discount rate (% p. a.) n.a. n.a. 90.2 n.a. 33.7 33.7 26.3 26.3
External performance (USD mn)
Goods exports* n.a. 1481.8 1531.1 1842.0 2368.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Goods imports* n.a. 1898.1 2666.3 4102.0 4799.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Trade balance* n.a. -416.3 -1135.2 -2261.0 -2431.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Current-account balance -512 -288.3 -968.2 -1318.4 -1800.0 -1180 -1341 -1298
Current balance/GDP (%) 1.8 2.4 7.6 8.8 12.1 6.4 8.9 n.a.
FDI net (USD mn) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 740 113 112 25
Gross external debt (USD mn) n.a. n.a. 9000 n.a. 10500 11500 12500 11500
Sources: Data marked * from CESMECON (1997), p. 8; others from WIIW (2001), pp. .60–61 and 448.
Note: As WIIW (2001) shows data only for 1990, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000, corresponding
columns for 1994 and 1996 contain data from CESMECON (1997). With foreign trade, where data from
CESMECON (1997) and data from WIIW (2001) disagree, data from CESMECON (1997) are adopted,
but supplemented with data from WIIW (2001).
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utilities (energy, communications, trans-
port, etc.)
Although this may give the impression
that privatization was rapid in Serbia, there
was a strange occurrence connected with
the hyperinflation. In 1994, new, retro-
spective legislation stipulated that the
amounts paid for privatized assets had to be
reassessed. This has meant that only 3 per
cent of all capital was recognized as privat-
ized. A higher percentage could be retained
only after paying substantial additional
sums of money. The result was an almost
complete suspension of privatization. The
structure of capital ownership then became
state 42 per cent, social 45 per cent and
private 3 per cent in Serbia, while in Mon-
tenegro it was 86, social 0 and private 14
per cent respectively (Kovacevic 1997, p.
246). While the idea of ‘social ownership’
had been that the state was no longer the
official owner of the means of production in
Yugoslavia in the socialist period, the state
paradoxically became the biggest owner
after the change of system. The budget con-
straint remained ‘soft’ in state and socially
owned enterprises alike.
5.2. Inconsistent reform of the bank-
ing system
Although the banks were converted into
joint-stock companies under the banking
reform of 1989, they were not privatized.
The 44 banks in the new Yugoslavia
founded before 1989 are known as the ‘old’
banks and the 67 founded since 1989 are
called the ‘new’ banks. The ownership
structure of the latter varies. Some are en-
tirely private while others employ both so-
cially owned and private capital, both do-
mestic and foreign. Although ‘new’ banks
account for less than 20 per cent of the
sector’s assets, they make 80 per cent of the
profits. ‘Old’ banks account for over 80 per
cent of the total balance of the banking
sector, especially the ‘big six’, with a total
share of about 60 per cent (Pitic 1999, pp.
341–2). A situation in which ‘debtors of a
bank are actually its owners’ persists in the
‘old ‘ banks, whose owners are not moti-
vated to maximize profits. Instead, enter-
prises buy shares in a bank to ensure that
the bank offers it credit. Instead of initiating
insolvency proceedings against enterprises
known to have no prospects, banks were
forced to keep them artificially alive for so-
cial and political reasons (Ibid., pp. 343–4).
It is said that bad loans constituted about 60
per cent of the social product in 1997 (La-
bus 1997, p. 38).
At the beginning of 1991, the gov-
ernment froze the population’s foreign-
currency deposits (‘old foreign-currency
savings deposits’) and failed to settle for
them. At the beginning of 1997, the total
liabilities of the state to the public were
DEM 6.4 billion (Vukotic 1997, p. 8). This
exacerbated the credibility crisis in the
banking system.
5.3. A delay in reforms
UN sanctions were lifted immediately after
the Dayton Accord in November 1995 and
foreign trade officially resumed. GDP in-
creased by 5.8 per cent in 1996 and 7.4 per
cent in 1997. Although the performance
was apparently not so bad, the Yugoslav
economy had serious structural problems.
Through the national conflicts and UN em-
bargo, the new Yugoslav economy main-
tained several features and defects of Titoite
self-managed socialism.
The Yugoslav economy had low inter-
national competitiveness. Its exports in
1997 were less than a half its imports and
the trade deficit of USD2.4 billion corre-
sponded to 16 per cent of GDP. The price
for covering such a huge deficit was exces-
sively high interest rates, which in turn
hiked up the exchange rate, stimulating
further imports and restraining exports.
High interest rates made it difficult for do-
mestic companies to obtain credit. The share
of investment was only 11 per cent of GDP.
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As a continual increase in profits was not to
be expected, companies laid off workers in-
stead of increasing employment. During the
period 1989–97, the number of employed
decreased from 2.9 million to 2.33 million.
(In the social sector it fell from 2.73 million
to 2 million, while in the private sector, it
rose from 58,000 to 320,000.) The number
of unemployed in 1997 was 816,000 and
the unemployment rate 26 per cent, with an
additional 800,000 or so hidden unem-
ployed. Unlike the number of employed, the
number of dependants increased (1.24 mil-
lion pensioners and 700,000 refugees). The
absence of a serious banking reform can be
explained by the lack of will to carry it out
(Sevic and Zamberlin 1999, p. 366).
In 1997, the share of the state budget
and its deficit accounted for 47.7 per cent
and 5.6 per cent of GDP respectively. The
state budget was suffering from a chronic
deficit due to the numerous loss-making
enterprises and a decrease in the number of
employed. The government decided not to
pay the wages of certain members of the
public sector and to delay paying pensions
(MacWilliams 1997, p. 382). To cope with
the budget deficit, the government was al-
ways tempted to print money and sell off
state property by the piece. A typical exam-
ple was Serbia Telecom, partially privatized
at the end of June 1997 to an Italian com-
pany (29 per cent) and a Greek company
(20 per cent). Most of the proceeds were
utilized to pay back wages and pensions. A
new law on ownership transformation was
adopted in Serbia in July 1997 and came
into effect in November.
5.4. Difficult rebirth
Reconstruction of the Yugoslav economy
calls for radical economic reform, accord-
ing to foreign observers and many people
inside the country. The biggest problem lies
with domestic politics. Slobodan Milosevic
managed to remain leader so long, despite
repeated failures and heavy criticism, be-
cause (i) the opposition was fragmented, (ii)
the government and ruling parties con-
trolled the mass media, (iii) Milosevic’s na-
tionalistic line had popular appeal, espe-
cially in the countryside. Milosevic’s coali-
tion of post-communists and extreme right-
wingers was also kept in place by the distri-
bution of managerial appointments. The
ostensible ‘privatization’ left the state as the
biggest owner of the means of production,
which was the source of the ruling parties’
power.
A programme of radical economic
reforms was announced in February 1997
by a group of 17 economists (G17) who
sought a new, democratic government in
Serbia and the Federation, describing the
Milosevic regime as ‘socialist totalitarian-
ism’ supported by an alliance of politics,
public enterprises and organized crime
(Vukotic 1998). At an international sympo-
sium entitled ‘Roles of Trade Unions in the
Privatization Process’, held in Belgrade in
June 1998, a trade-union leader explained,
‘It is paradoxical that an international sym-
posium with such a subject is being organ-
ized by trade unions. Usually trade unions
are the biggest victims in privatization.
Trade unions in Yugoslavia do not shrink
from privatization as a means of resolving
the present situation.’ With the banking
system, G17 advocated overcoming the
credibility crisis the G17 advocated solving
the problem of government’s foreign-
currency debts to the public, establishing
independence of the central bank, returning
to international financial markets, and in-
troducing foreign capital. However, FR
Yugoslavia did not succeed in getting full
financial assistance during the Milosevic
period, because membership of the IMF was
not obtained. In mid-1998 the United States
and the EU decided to ban investment in FR
Yugoslavia, a freeze on the bank accounts of
Yugoslavs abroad, and a ban on landings by
Yugoslav civil aircraft while the country’s
approach to the Kosovo problem remained
unsatisfactory.
Devaluation from YUD 3.3 to YUD
6.0 to the German mark in April 1998 did
not increase Yugoslav exports or improve
the trade balance due to the high depend-
33
ence of Yugoslav producers on imported
raw materials and capital goods. The
growth rate of social product in 1998 was
2.6 per cent. Recession ensued in the latter
half of 1998 and industrial production in
January 1999 was down by 9.6 per cent
from the same period of the previous year.
According to a questionnaire survey of
firms (Economska Politika, Broj 2441, Feb-
ruary 1, 1999, p. 8), the main constraints
on production were shortages of credit
(41.8 per cent), imported materials (20 per
cent) and demand (17.1 per cent), coupled
with low prices (13.9 per cent). By the
spring of 1999, the Yugoslav economy was
at a standstill.
5.5. Kosovo and the Nato bombard-
ment
The groups aiming for democratic rebirth in
the Yugoslav Federation were prevented
from ousting the Milosevic administration
by divisions among themselves. Milosevic,
meanwhile, failed to find a peaceful solu-
tion in Kosovo, where armed clashes be-
tween the local Albanian ‘Kosovo Liberation
Army’ and Serbian security corps were
taking place and many Albanians becoming
refugees. Mediation by the United States
and others went badly.
The Yugoslav rejection of a final pro-
posal for peace provided the occasion for
Nato to begin aerial bombardment of the
country on March 24, 1999.18 The US and
West European forces intervened militarily
in Kosovo to stop ethnic cleansing by Serbia,
but it is difficult to say that their purpose
was achieved. In fact, military intervention
brought a surge of Albanian refugees, while
the bombardment caused heavy civilian
                                                
18 Just before the deadline at Rambouillet, the US
made an additional proposal – Appendix B (1999) of
the Final Draft of the Peace Agreement – requesting
that Nato armed forces be given strong extra-
territorial rights and freedom to deploy not only in
Kosovo, but throughout the Federation. This was un-
acceptable to Yugoslavia at all.
casualties elsewhere in the FR Yugoslavia.
For the time being, the perceived interna-
tional aggression tended to reinforce
Milosevic’s political power. Damage on the
Yugoslav side was estimated at about
USD30 billion, with more than 600,000 lost
jobs and 2.5 million citizens losing sources
of earnings. Unemployment is said to have
reached 50 per cent. Thousands industrial,
commercial and public facilities were de-
stroyed or damaged. The 23 oil refineries
hit caused serious pollution. Transportation
and communication facilities destroyed or
severely damaged included 61 bridges,
railways, roads and airports. GDP decreased
by 22 per cent in 1999.
The first conference of donor coun-
tries on the reconstruction of Kosovo was
held on July 28, 1999 in Brussels and a
meeting on cooperation for stabilization in
South-Eastern Europe on July 29–30 in
Sarajevo. The Milosevic administration was
not admitted, although delegations from
surrounding countries were. No assistance
other than humanitarian aid was permitted
for the FR Yugoslavia, which had suffered
the worst damage.
5.6. Collapse of the Milosevic Regime
Milosevic was defeated by Vojslav Kostu-
nica, a candidate of the Democratic Union
of opposition groups at a presidential elec-
tion in late September 2000. Milosevic tried
to retain power, but was dislodged early in
October by a surge of public protests. Kos-
tunica’s provisional government rapidly re-
stored membership of the United Nations
(November 2000), IMF (December 2000),
the EBRD (December 2000) and the World
Bank (May 2001). In December 2000 the
government began to negotiate three suc-
cessive financial agreements with the IMF to
support its stabilization and market policies.
The international community took a chari-
table view and a donor conference in De-
cember 2000 decided on emergency aid to
prevent a humanitarian disaster over the
winter.
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The new government that took office
in January inherited an inflation rate of 120
per cent; a non-existent foreign-exchange
market, a sick banking sector, a huge gov-
ernment budget deficit, sizeable arrears of
debt and a wide trade gap. The foreign debt
since 1992 had reached USD12.2 billion
(equivalent to 145 per cent of GDP). Unem-
ployment was running at 27.3 per cent. In-
dustry was using obsolete equipment.
Shortages included electric power, pharma-
ceuticals, oil and gas, fertilizers, and foods
(sugar, cooking oil, wheat, etc.) (Yugoslavia
2002). It was impossible for FR Yugoslavia
to reconstruct its economy without interna-
tional support. A donor conference spon-
sored by the World Bank and the European
Commission was held in Brussels on June
29, 2001, to which the government of Ser-
bia submitted a detailed ‘Reform Agenda’.
This contained 36 priority programmes and
projects, focusing on three main areas: (i)
establishing the rule of law, (ii) renewing
the economy, and (iii) combating poverty
and offering social protection to vulnerable
groups.
5.7. Privatization by trial and error
The privatization begun in the first half of
1990 had failed to bring positive change in
the economy. A further round after the
Dayton Agreement, under the 1997 Act on
Ownership Transformation, strongly fa-
voured granting shares to employees, with
up to 60 per cent of the equity being re-
served for them free of charge. Almost 1000
companies adopted this form of privatiza-
tion, and most were quickly privatized be-
tween October 2000 to February 2001,
following unification of the official and un-
official exchange rates. However, the gov-
ernment gained very little revenue from the
sales and there was negligible inflow of
badly needed capital from abroad. The new
government suspended the legislation to
limit further losses and review the process
(Ministry for International Economic Rela-
tions of Serbia 2001).
The corporate sector was in a parlous
state, affected also by a decade of economic
sanctions and by the Nato bombardment.
There had been a 60 per cent fall in output
between 1990 to 2000 and a dramatic in-
crease in the debts of state-owned enter-
prises to domestic and international credi-
tors. Much of this related to 28 large in-
dustrial concerns (Ibid.). A new law on pri-
vatization adopted in May 2001 was fol-
lowed by the establishment of an Agency for
Privatization in June. Although the FR
Yugoslavia made a very late start with pri-
vatization, compared with other transition
countries, it was ‘better late than never’.19
All state-owned enterprises are to be
privatized by 2005. In 2001, three cement
works were sold, and in the first half of
2002, an additional 15 big factories were
privatized. By the end of 2002, 44 large
companies, including the Zastava car fac-
tory, were being privatized. There are two
procedures: tender privatization and auc-
tion privatization. All large enterprises, the
number of which does not exceed 150, will
be subject to tender privatization by the Pri-
vatization Agency. The more than 7000
small and medium-sized firms will be pri-
vatized by auction carried out by the enter-
prise itself with state assistance (Yugoslavia
2002).
5.8. Grounds for anxiety
Outside observers still see grounds for anxi-
ety in the countries that make up former
Yugoslavia. The Republic of Montenegro,
headed by President Djukanovic, intensified
its moves toward independence in the clos-
ing years of the Milosevic period, including
use of the DEM as legal tender. This re-
ceived Western encouragement designed to
hasten the overthrow of Milosevic. Now
                                                
19 This remark was made by Branislav Soskic, presi-
dent of the Association of Economics in Serbia, in the
keynote speech at an academic conference on priva-
tization at the Faculty of Economics, University of
Belgrade in early April 1997.
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that the Milosevic regime has collapsed, the
West no longer hopes for the emergence of
a further small, independent country, but
the momentum has continued. In March
2002, Serbia and Montenegro agreed to
dissolve the Yugoslav Federation in favour
of a ‘state union’ of Serbia and Montenegro,
which came into effect on February 2003.
Full independence for Montenegro may still
be imminent.
Meanwhile the conflict deepened
between Federal President Vojslav Kostu-
nica, a moderate nationalist, and the late
prime minister of Serbia, Zoran Djindjic,
who was oriented toward the West, with
Kostunica’s party withdrawing from the
Democratic Union. The election for presi-
dent of Serbia took place in October 2002,
with Kostunica as a candidate, since the
Serbian president became more powerful
after the formation of the state union. He
gained more votes than his main opponent,
Deputy Federal Prime Minister Miroljub La-
bus, but the poll of less than 50 per cent
meant the election was invalid. Labus did
not stand in the repeat election in Decem-
ber, when Kostunica won 58 per cent of the
vote against an extreme-right nationalist,
but the election was again invalid due to a
45 per cent poll. The voter apathy reflected
dissatisfaction at the miserable economic
conditions and disgust at the struggle for
power between the two big-name politi-
cians who led the political change in 2000.
It is noteworthy that an ultra-nationalist
like We should pay attention to the fact that
an ultra nationalist (Vojislav Seselj) won 36
per cent of the votes. In Montenegro, a
presidential election in December 2002 was
likewise invalid because of a low poll.
The assassination of Serbian Prime
Minister Zoran Djindjic on March 12, 2003
was followed immediately by a state of
emergency. It is reported that the perpetra-
tors were members of the security police
under the Milosevic regime, discontented
with Djindjic’s policies in general, particu-
larly the crackdown on black-marketeering.
Djindjic was succeeded by his deputy prime
minister (and deputy leader of the Demo-
cratic Party), Zoran Zivkovic, who declared
that his government would pursue Djind-
jic’s policies. To improve the investment
climate and reconstruct the economy, there
has been an appeal to the Yugoslav people
to restrain themselves from parochial na-
tionalism and secure political stability.
6) PROSPECTS
Although for Slovenia, ‘the cost of re-
orientating trade from protected to com-
petitive markets were significant’ (Menc-
inger 1997, p. 213), it has so far succeeded
in entering EU markets. For the time being,
the small country’s strategy for finding ap-
propriate specialization areas has been suc-
cessful and world events such as the end of
the Cold War, globalization and regionalism
are running in its favour. Slovenia had ad-
vantages compared with other transition
countries. As part of former Yugoslavia, it
developed an albeit imperfect decentralized
market economy during the socialist period.
The decentralized coordination mechanism
Slovenia inherited seems to have facilitated
the transition to a successful market econ-
omy. Slovenia also experienced a long pe-
riod of self-management. The World Bank
(1996a and 1996b) points to this as a
negative tradition, but the author agrees
with Mencinger that there must be advan-
tages in such experience helpful for Slove-
nia’s future economic development. Slovene
workers have the kind of strong sense of
enterprise allegiance found in Japan, as do
managers. Managers in the highly central-
ized planned economies were simply ad-
ministrators, but in Slovenia, they acted ex-
ecutives, gaining experience and know-how
about the market economy. Slovenia has to
solve many problems to do with the struc-
tural adjustment and harmonization to the
EU, but it is to be hoped that its strengths as
a small country will mean that social cohe-
sion and adaptability come more easily.
Despite initial Western countries
goodwill at the time of independence, Croa-
tia’s economic performance has not been
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good. It suffered severe damage in its inde-
pendence war. More seriously still, the poli-
cies of the Tudjman government failed. A
change of government eventually came in
January 2000, followed by the election of a
new president to replace the deceased
Tudjman. The new government came out
against the extreme nationalism of its
predecessor and announced democratic re-
forms. This will improve relations with
Western countries and generate active as-
sistance that will help Croatia to make use
of its geopolitical advantage. Its economy
should soon develop and the transition to a
market economy proceed smoothly. If it
finds its niche in world markets, it will also
be able to make use of the ‘strengths of
small country’ to attain rapid economic de-
velopment.
FR Yugoslavia does not have such
strengths. Its economy was damaged suc-
cessively by the break-up of former Yugo-
slavia, the national conflicts, the UN sanc-
tions, and the Nato bombardment. It was
unable to utilize its experiences of a decen-
tralized market economy under self-
managed socialism. This has been a ‘lost
decade’ for FR Yugoslavia. However, the
essential cause of the economic crisis was
the delay in reforms. Serbia and Montene-
gro now have to take drastic action to accel-
erate privatization, deregulate small and
medium-sized enterprises, reform the fi-
nancial system, encourage FDI, etc. The
success of these reforms will require active
support from the international community
that was withheld from the Milosevic ad-
ministration. At last, Serbia and Montenegro
may succeed in overcoming their interna-
tional isolation, since the collapse of the
Milosevic regime in October 2000. The new
leadership inherited economic misery and
countless intractable problems. To improve
the investment climate, Serbia and Monte-
negro will indeed have to refrain from pa-
rochial nationalism and secure political sta-
bility.
Bosnia-Herzegovina has yet to recover
from its civil war. Hostile feelings between
communities remain. It is indispensable for
the Office of the High Commissioner (OHR)
and the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (SFOR) to stay for the time
being. Promoting reconciliation and nation-
building is a matter of the highest priority.
International assistance is indispensable at
this stage in economic recovery. Thereafter
the emphasis will have to shift from hu-
manitarian to commercial assistance and a
market-oriented economy, including the
privatization process.
After independence, Macedonia was
negatively affected by the civil war in the
former Yugoslav Federation, UN sanctions,
its conflict with Greece, the Nato bombard-
ment of Serbia, and so on. When the Kosovo
war ended in June 1999, Macedonia at last
had the peaceful environment needed for
economic development. For the time being,
international assistance is necessary for re-
covery and reconstruction of its economy. It
is also necessary to educate young people to
adapt to a market economy. The ‘strengths
of a small country’ can be expected to out-
weigh its weaknesses soon. Macedonia,
along with Serbia and Montenegro, needs to
develop regional cooperation in the Balkans,
in the hope of joining the EU eventually.
Until recently, the international com-
munity has extended less assistance to the
Balkans than to the CEE countries. A great
deal more assistance for economic recon-
struction and stabilization in the former will
be needed to ensure lasting peace.20
                                                
20 Tsuneo Morita, previously of Nomura Research
Institute Budapest and now president of Tateyama
Magyar Laboratorium Ltd, is quoted by Morita
(2000, pp. 196–7) as saying, ‘The gap between
countries… with [market-economy] experience and
those without such experience is bigger than esti-
mated. If the process of systemic transformation in
Central Europe takes 20–30 years, it would be rea-
sonable to view it as a historical project taking 40,
50 or more years in the Balkans, and over a century
in former Soviet countries… It will be a sustained
historical process.’
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